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ANNE PETERS* 
1. The 'Transparency Turn'1 in Global Governance 
Tr~nspare~cy has been called 'an overused but underanalysed concept'.2 
Th~s certamly holds true for contemporary international law. In all 
maJor fields o~ international law - e.g. environmental law, economic 
law, human n~ts law, international humanitarian law, health law, 
peace-and-security law - demands for more transparent institutions 
and procedu~es. have ~ecently. been voiced by civil-society actors, by 
t~tes, a~d w1thm the mternahonal institutions themselves. This book 
tnes t? identify and map these quests and responses and to fill the 
analytical . gap surrounding them. Its overall aspiration is to obtain a 
cro. s-sechon ?f the developments and debates in various areas of inter-
nat10nal law m order to lay the foundations for a broader and more 
systematic analysis of 'global transparency'. 
Transp~renc~ is here understood as a culture, condition, scheme or 
s~ruc~ure 11:1 wh1';h relevant information (for example on law and poli-
tics) 1s available .. Generally speaking, if something is transparent, you 
can see thr?ugh 1t. The opposites of transparency are not only opaque-
ness (opacity), secrecy and confidentiality, but also complexity and 
• ~ thank my collaborators and authors Oma Ben- aftali, Andrea Bianchi, Megan Donaldson, 
ukas Mus'."""ea, ~ore eumann and Roy Peled for careful reading and for lucid remarks 
on. a preVJous version of this chapter. I am also indebted to my co-Fellows at the 
W,ssenschaftskolleg for useful feedback: Kelly Askew, Hubertus Buchstein Delph· 
?ardey, Bruce Kogan, Cristin~ ~font, ~d Ussama Makdisi. Their input has hopefully he!~ 
tmprove the chapter; all remairung deficits are attributable to me. 
I _borrow ~is term from Aarti Gupta, 'Transparency under Scrutiny: Information 
Disclosure rn Gl~bal Environmental Governance', Global Environmental Politics 8 
2 
(2008), 1-7, 6 (which the author used in discussing environmental governance). 
Ibid., l. 
3 See for the concept in deta.il Andrea Bianchi, 'Introduction: On Power and Illusion. The 
Concept of Transparency rn International Law', chapter l in this volume. 
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dL rder. The multitud f antonym how that the concept of tran -
paren · ha multiple meaning it elf, inter alia depending on the con-
te. t. Con ept related to 'tran parency' are 'publicity', 'publicne ' and 
'openne '. While notably 'publicity' i a traditional term of political 
the ry and philo ophy, tran parency ha become a more recent buzz-
, ·ord. trictly peaking, tran parency i the mere acce ibility of infor-
mation, \ herea publicity i the fact that information i actuall 
ac e ed.4 Although tran parency i no guarantee that publicity will 
really come about, the e two term will be u ed interchangeably in thi 
hapter. 
The preceding chapter of thi book have analy ed the obligee and 
beneficiarie of tran parency obligation in international la\ : \ ho owe 
tran parency to whom? They have examined the object of tran parency: 
, ·hat ha been made tran parent - in titution , procedure , meeting , 
ocument ? They have analy ed the objective of tran parency: to what 
end? They have looked at the timing: i tran parency brought about in 
real time or in retro pect? They have looked at anctionability: can 
non-di clo ure be challenged and doe unju tified non-di clo ure 
involve any anction (of a legal or political kind or impinging on 
omeone or omething' reputation)? And finally the book ha examined 
the cope and nature of exceptions to tran parency. Cro -cutting chap-
ter ha e addre ed different governance function (rule-making,
5 
rule 
application, and di pute ettlement6). Chapter 19 by Megan Donald on 
and Benedict King bury shows that many international organization 
have adopted internal rules on transparency policie which have com-
mon feature , re embling national freedom of information laws.7 
The objective of this concluding chapter is fourfold. First, it seek to 
dra, together the findings from the chapter , against the background of 
the aim of the entire project and the re earch question mentioned 
above (especially in sections 5-7). Second, it seeks to embed the e 
~ Daniel aurin, 'Transparency, Publicity, Accountability - The Mi sing Links', wiss 
Political cience Review 12 (2006), 90-98, 91. 
5 Alan Boyle/Kasey McCall-Smith, 'Transparency in International Law-Making', chapter 
16 in this volume. 
Thore eumann/Bruno imma, 'Transparency in International Adjudication', chapter 
17 in this volume. ~ ee also the empirical study by Alexandru Grigorescu, 'Transparen~ of 
Intergovernmental Organizations: The Roles of Member States, lnternatJonal 
Bureaucracie and ongovernmental Organizations', International Studies Quarterly 
51 (2007), 625-648, in which the author asks which international organizations are likely 
to be more transparent, and why. 
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findings within the broader transparency debate. This include a di -
cussion of the specific significance of transparency as a practice and 
principle in the context of globalization ( ections 3-4), relations between 
transparency and normative concepts uch as legitimacy, democracy 
and accountability ( ections 8-13), reflection on the value, function , 
and drawbacks of tran parency in international law and governance, 
specifically in comparison to (and in combination with) domestic tran -
parency (sections 10 and 14), and an account of the legal status of a 
possible transparency norm, including its relation to the human right of 
information (sections 4 and 17). Third, the chapter makes policy pro-
posals for regulating tran parency, especially with regard to exception 
needed for deliberation ( ection 15.2). Finally, this chapter interpret 
the rise of transparency in international law as a manifestation of a 
paradigm shift from a 'private' to a 'public' law-character of interna-
tional law and in the end identifies lines for further re earch (section 19). 
To begin, the overall findings of this book's chapters are striking. 
Institutions, proce se and mechanisms in international law have, on 
balance, become more transparent. In addition, the trend is away from 
merely 'reactive' towards more 'proactive' tran parency.8 States and 
international organizations no longer espouse only a passive posture -
namely in allowing the information to be available to others if the latter 
so choose or if they request access or have the time, means and skills to 
look. Rather, the relevant entities engage in active disclosure policie . 
The e can range from public relations measures and image campaigns 
(notably in the busine s ector)9 to outright disinformation and propa-
ganda. All that has happened basically since the turn of the millennium. 
8 
Helen Darbishire, 'Proactive Transparency: The Future of the Right to Information?', 
World Bank Institute Governance Working Paper Series o. 56598 (2010). For the EU in 
different terms ('active' and 'pa sive' transparency), see Anne Peters, Elemente einer 
Theorie der Verfassung Europas (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), 694-697; Carl-
Sebastian Zoellner, 'Tran parency: An Analysis of an Evolving Fundamental Principle in 
International Economic Law', Michigan Journal of International Law 27 (2006), 
579-628, 627; for international adjudication Thore eumann/Bruno Simma, 
'Transparency in International Adjudication', chapter 17 in this volume. 
See also Thomas . Hale, 'Transparency, Accountability and Global Governance', 
Global Governance 14 (2008), 73-94, 75, who defines transparency as ranging from 
answering inquiries to general di closure (making un olicited information available). 
Richard W. Oliver, What is Transparency? (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 3-4, calls 
the proactive posture the 'new transparency'. 
9 
Larry Cata Backer, 'Transparency and Business in International Law: Governance 
between orm and Technique', chapter 18 in this volume. 
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Mirroring Dome tic Tran parency? . 
2. . ht b compared to a pnor 
Thi novel international tr~n parency ~1gthe 'freedom of information 
development within dome tic la\ ' name y cratic tate ' e er ince ~he 
e ·plo ion''o of the 1990 . In modern demo cy) of the legi latt e 
· bi' ·ty (or tran paren . 
eighteenth century, the pu ici 
11 
of J·udicial pro eedmg 
11 d · t nd tatute a ' e a th ru1 of pro e an it ac a f democracy and e e 
have been con idered nece ary element o . d the working of the 
~ eh longer peno , d 
law. In contra t, and or a mu I f high politic and in da -to- a ' 
e ecuti e branch, both at the leve o T parency in thi regard ha 
h b artly ecret. ran h' h nt admini tration, a een p f . formation law w ic gra 
been created by worldwide freedo~. 0 
1
~ procedure and admini -
in ight into previ u ly ecret adm1~~ tratl e ha been triggered, 
trative file _12 Thi kind of 'dome tic tran par:oC:ement pre ing for 
. tal and con umer d ' th inter alia, by env1ronmen . and the ri ks a ociate w1 
information on environmental imp~ct f th concept of ' e, Public 
U a by the n e O e · the certain product ' a , e . th t tran parency will increase 
fanagement' \-vith it_ :xpec_tation . _a Additionally, tran nationally 
effecti ene of admm1 trat1v~3 ~t1V1ty. ency International,'4 and the 
a tive GO ( uch a Art. 19, ran _par 1 ·zation and interna-
1s) · t ationa orgam • 
Open ociety Foundation , m em h t parency of tate . The 
h ed for t e ran ECD) tional treaty regime ave pre . d De elopment (0 ' 
E · c Co-operation an . Organization for conom1 th WTO and other mterna-
the World Bank, the Council of Europe, e an~ ential component 
h . oned tran parency a . . t of tional bodie have c amp1 d ·f t mandated, rec1p1en 
of good governance and encourage '1/ ;~ir member tate to adopt 
aid, borrower tate ' and more genera y 
'The Global Explo ion of Fr~dom o.f 
to John M. Ackerman/Irma E: Sandoval-Balle tero 5 (2006). 5-130; Patrick B1rkin. ha_"': 
Information Law • Administrative Law Review d the Ideal (Cambndge Um,er •I:) 
' . Th L the Practice an Freedom of Information: e aw, 
Pre 4th edn, 2010), 498. d le debat public en Grande-Bretagne d 
, 1 See Delphine Gardey, '"Enregistrer" et ren r_e ence et rc!velateur de la dem>°c;ue 
en France. La tc!nographie com~e eXIg alembert/Olivier Rozenberg (eds. , . aire 
parlementaire?', in Cecile Vigour/Cla'.re D: G debats parlementaires pour les sciences 
arler le parlement: Methodes et en1eu: es ·uri rudence, forthcoming) . 
~ociales (Paris: Librairie genc!rale de dro::J:r~a~on iaws, see Toby Mend~!, F~eedomo°fi 
12 For comparative urveys _of freedom of Paris: UNESCO, 200 ); David Barusar, ~reedor 
Information: A Comparative Legal Survey ( , 2006 available at www.freedominfo. g/ 
of Information around the World 2006' ' 
documents/global_survey2006.pdf. 
1• transparency.org. 13 www.article19.org. www. 
1s www.opensocietyfoundations.org. 
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freedom of information laws, or at least become transparent in certain 
specific sectors such as trade legislation and policy. This strategy has 
been closely linked to the global fight against corruption, which has been 
recognized as a major obstacle to the realization of the core objectives 
of global governance - namely economic and societal development, 
protection of human rights, respect for the rule oflaw, and development. 
For example, the 2003 UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) 
asks each State party to 'develop and implement or maintain effective, 
coordinated anti-corruption policies that promote the participation 
of society and reflect the principles of the rule of law, proper manage-
ment of public affairs and public property, integrity, transparency and 
accountability.' 16 For similar reasons, the Council of Europe Convention 
on Access to Official Documents (No. 205) of 200917 requires member 
States to establish systems of access to their documents. A core question 
of this study is whether the demonstrated trend towards more interna-
tional transparency is basically a repetition and reflection of that domes-
tic development or whether it can be better understood as something 
different, either in part or in whole. 
3. Transparency and Globalization 
3.1 The Globalized Information Society 
We are living in an 'information society', 18 in the 'information age', 19 an 
age in which information is a crucial resource of power and well-being. 
Richard W. Oliver speaks of an 'information-transparency cycle': 
16 GA, Report of the Ad Hoe Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention against 
Corruption on the Work of Its First to Seventh Sessions, A/58/422, 7 October 2003, 
annex: United ations Convention against Corruption, art. 5 (emphasis added). See also 
art . 7, 9, 10 and 13, requiring transparency in the public sector and in public procure-
ment, which also demands public reporting, and transparency and participation in 
public decision-making. 
17 Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents, 18 June 2009, CETS 
o. 205, not yet in force. The convention needs ten ratifications, and currently has six: 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, Lithuania, Montenegro, Norway and Sweden. Eight 
States have signed but not yet ratified: Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Moldova, 
Serbia, Slovenia and Macedonia. 
18 Scott Lash, Critique of Information (London: Sage Publications, 2002). 
19 Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture (Malden/Oxford: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2nd edn, 2010). 
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3.2 Globalization-induced Intran p r 11 ' 
Globalization24 and global g ernan 
created a novel degree of political intran p r n 
atory tran parency mea ure . Fir t, b th th in r 
of political i ue and the concomitant tran fer f ta · 
international in titution ha e m difi d th natur and 
nation- tate . Even if the e tate , under their d 
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must be transparent vis-a-vis their citizenry, State transparency is no 
longer sufficient to guarantee the overall transparency needed to hold the 
relevant power-holders to account because the States are no longer the 
only ones to wield political power. Second, State activity has many more 
extraterritorial effects that impact persons situated outside the acting 
State's boundaries. Substantially affected persons have a legitimate inter-
est in being informed as to these extraterritorial activities but still face a 
higher degree of intransparency than that which usually exists within a 
State's borders. Third, the distribution of governmental functions among 
different actors, including those placed 'above' the States, in itself creates 
a new intransparency. Multilevel governance, the multiplication of 
centres of authority (polycentrism) and network-type structures make 
governance less transparent than ever before. Decision-making on the 
international level is not only often less transparent than within a State 
but the interplay between the multiple levels increases the intranspar-
ency. The net result is an overall reduction of transparency and notably 
of that kind of transparency needed to allocate responsibility for political 
action.25 
3.3 Compensatory Transparency 
These three types of globalization-induced intransparency suggest that 
in order to at least preserve the current level of transparency there are 
two things necessary. First, the transparency obligations of States must 
be extended to new types of beneficiaries such as foreign States, interna-
tional organizations, and to those natural or legal persons not formally 
under a State's jurisdiction but substantially affected by its policy deci-
sions. Second, new types of transparency obligees must be envisaged in 
order to compensate for that loss of transparency which is incurred by 
global governance and the extraterritorial effects of State activity. 
A functional argument in favour of extending transparency obligations 
to international actors compares globalization to privatization. 
Privatization comprises the phenomenon of outsourcing - entities 
which are private-law constructs in form have been entrusted with the 
fulfilment of public tasks (furnishing of infrastructure, running prisons, 
etc.) and endowed with specific powers and funds to that end. It is 
generally thought that these should be subject to similar legal standards 
25 See Jurgen Brohmer, Transparenz als Verfassungsprinzip (Tiibingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2004), 376. 
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a formally public entitie are, in order to ecure proper fulfilment of 
the e ta ks and prevent the abu e of po-. er .26 Thi functional con id-
eration ha moti ated ever more dome tic la, -maker to extend the 
ope of application of tatute relating to information (both data pro-
te tion and acce to document law ) to formally pri ate actor who 
exerci e public function . Following thi logic, the Council of Eur~pe 
Convention on Acee to fficial Document of 2009 ( o. 205), which 
normally mandate acce to official document held b 'public 
authoritie ', additionally tate that each party ma 'declare that the 
definition of "public authoritie " al o include ( ... ) natural_ or leg~l 
per on in far a they perform public functions or operate with public 
funds, according to national law.'
27 
. . 
Thi line of rea oning can be extended to international org~mzat~o_n · 
Formally, the e are con tituted by tate and are inter-p_ubhc ~ntJ.tJ.e · 
From a functional per pective, they are performing ta ' m the mtere. t 
of all tate and/or of the global public . The policy ugge tion then 1 
that the ame requirement of tran parency hould be impo ed when 
public function are 'zoned up' to actor 'above' the nati?n- t~te. T~e 
rea on for thi dual exten ion i that over ight and control 1 de uable m 
the e ea e a well. The exerci e of functionally public P°' er hould be 
accompanied by accountability; and tran parency and freedom of infor-
mation i a vehicle to bring thi about. 
It i therefore rea onable that international organization hould be 
ubject to imilar transparency requirement a tate . The wor~g of 
Convention o. 20528 would eem to allow member tate to de 1gnate 
international organization - which perform public function and oper-
ate with public fund - a 'public authoritie • in thi en e and ~bje t 
them to the Convention' transparency requirement , then operatJ.ve a 
dome tic law. 
To conclude, the more inten e global governance become , the more it 
take over function that were previou ly fulfilled b dome tic a tor · 
Becau e of this impact and because of the e function • global go ernance 
26 A different matter i that all busine actor (beyond tho e who are entru ted with publi 
functions) exerci e ome type of 'economic power' which ma' be abused._ Bu_t thi does 
not in it elf justify imposing tran parency requirement on them because t~ differ from 
political power, a pecial type of power created b drawing together people_ ID a _common 
undertaking (Martin Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (Oxford mver tt)' Pr 
2010), 11). 
2~ Convention o. 205, 2009 (n 17), art. 1(2)(a)(ii)(3). 
28 Convention o. 205, 2009 (n 17). 
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should be subject to similar (at least functionaly similar) legal con-
straints and conditions as is national governance. Therefore the princi-
ple of transparency should also come to bear more on global governance 
as a constraint and condition of governance. Transparency should and 
can here fulfil functions similar to those in the domestic seting (social 
acceptance, legal certainty, accountability, rationalization), while the 
democratic rationale of transparency for international law-making is 
less straightforward (see on this section 11). That type of transparency 
might be caled 'compensatory transparency' because it is intended to 
compensate for transparency losses that are side-effects of globalization 
and privatization.29 It can be understood a a manifestation of compen-
satory con titutionalism and multilevel governance.30 
3.4 Transparency as a Global Public Good 
Finaly, tran parency has become a global public good.31 The idea of 
global public goods (in the plural) draws on the notion of 'the' public 
good, but has been re-conceptualized and broadened by transferring it 
from the national to the global level. Global public goods in this broad 
sense do not necessarily qualify as pure public goods in terms of tradi-
tional economic theory, where a public good is a good that is non-rival 
(consumption of the good by one individual does not reduce availability 
of the good for consumption by others) and non-excludable (no one can 
be effectively excluded from using the good).32 Global public goods, as 
conceptualized by the United ations Development Programme, are 
socialy determined, not the result of market forces. They comprise 
rival goods which have been made (partialy) exclusive, such as fish 
29 Thomas Cotier/Michelangelo Temmerman, 'Tran parency and Intelectual Property 
Protection in International Law', chapter 8 in thi  volume. 30 Anne Peters, 'Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of 
Fundamental International orms and Structures', Leiden Journal of International 
Law 19 (2006), 579-610. 31 See the outcomes of the re earch programme on 'Global Public Goods' of the UN 
Development Programme: Inge Kaul/Pedro Conceicao (eds.), Providing Global Goods: 
Managing Globalisation (Oxford University Press, 1999); Inge Kaul/Isabele Grunberg/ 
Marc A. Stern (eds.), Providing Public Global Goods: International Cooperation in the 
21st Century (Oxford University Press, 2003). See also Scot Barret, Why Cooperate? 
The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods (Oxford University Press, 2010); Jean-
Bernard Auby, La globalisation, le droit et l'Etat (Pari : L.G.D.J., 2nd edn, 2010), 174-182. 
32 Paul A. Samuel on, 'A Pure Theory of Public Expenditure', Review of Economics and 
Statistics 36 (1954), 387-389. 
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.  d ke t or made non-exclu ive, tocks· they al o include nonnval go . p b d en e notabl · ' 33 GI bal blic go d m that roa er uch a information. o pu . er be furni bed on 
d h.  h ot in a at factory mann compri e goo w 1c cann (' ommon her-
the national level. Be ide natural or ct~ra~ re ou;~~jec~ive uch a 
itage of mankind'), the e may al O be glod ~ ue 0e ·plicitl , formulated 
tran parency. niver aly acknowledge a ue 'al . f 20 com-b! ' Milennium Dec arat1on o • in the General A em Y . 1 d ( ) tran parenc)' pri e 'good governance at the intern~t1onal leve .a:nd. ;the right of the 
in the financial, monetary and trading Y tern ' 
C , • 35 public to have acce to in,ormaton · 
4. The Tran ferability of Tran parency to the International phere 
be de irable or even nece ary, Although international transparency m~y 36 . 'ght ,el be unfea-h tory rat10nale it m1 " e pecialy under te compen a ' b ti and tru tural 
ible. The main problem would e_em to ~e ~ I ta;r ;ut what are the 
difference between dome tic and mternatlon a,th application of a 
relevant difference , and do they realy prevent e 
tran parency norm? . . 11 relied on regulation b · Fir t of al, international law has traditwna Y eh . . -a-d-and-control me an1 m v1 revelation for lack of tronger comman . ts third-party If rti g di do ure reqmremen , i overeign tat~ . e -repo _n ' bi kli tin ha e been regular!' 
monitoring, blaming and shammg, and ac g. tate and pu h-
applied a tool for inducing behavioural change ; f hionable fact-
ing them toward compliance. Beside ' the curr~n ~ arency. Al of 
finding mi ion are pecific instrument for creatmgd J:s uraging it 
thi has functioned relatively smoothly. A oppo e to O ' 
( 31) 3 for an expanded concept of 33 See Kaul et al., Providing Public Global Goods 2003d n ~ d, tatus The author define th · · Uy etenmne · public goods, taking into account ~ir ocia . ood . the um of national public global public good a globalized ~atio_n~ public g , i.e. 
goods plus international cooperation (1b1d., 10). 
34 Auby, La globalisation 2010 (~ 31), 18~-181~1ilennium Declaration, A/RES/55, 2, I 
35 UNGA, Re olution 55/2: United auons Eradication and cction V: eptember 2000, ection II: Development and Poverty 
Human Rights, Democracy and Good Governance. 
36 ee above, ection 3.3. bility al O mater for deciding 
37 The e differences and the en uing problem o~ ~~ ~  international law ( ec below, whether transparency can funcuon a a pnn p 
section 16). 
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this certain structure of international law would seem to accommodate a 
transparency principle rather well. 
In the domestic sphere, along with information campaigns, the rela-
tively new obligations imposed on business actors to label and report 
and have themselves monitored, audited and certified (with regard 
to products, their environmental impact, etc.) to some extent 
resemble the aforementioned traditional international legal approach. 
The specific regulatory strategy here is an indirect market-driven 
regulation ('regulation through revelation', 'disclosure as governance', 
' informational governance').38 The idea is that consumers, investors, 
employees and other market participants who obtain these pieces of 
information will react with their market choices (to desist from buying 
a product, from investing in an enterprise, from working in a firm) and 
thereby pressuring the business to adapt its activity in a way that is 
desirable to the responsible consumer, investor, employee. Archon Fung 
and co-authors have called this strategy 'targeted transparency'. It 
resembles market-based regulation by providing choices. Both users 
and disclosers are free to take no action at all. The targeted entities 
(e.g. business) receive their signals not directly from the regulators but 
from the behaviour of the users themselves. Regulation by transparency 
is thus a distinct form of regulation.39 
In the domestic sphere, the merits of this approach to regulation 
('deregulate and disclose') are contested. Touted as a new mode of 
governance by some - as an innovative, less costly, less intrusive, more 
market-oriented tool - it has been criticized as toothless by others. In 
fact, 'informational governance' seems to function only under certain 
conditions and, for instance, has not prevented scandalous misbehaviour 
in the field of finances and securities. 
In international law, the traditional reporting and disclosure require-
ments imposed on States bear a superficial resemblance to just that type 
of regulation. But there remains one crucial difference between 
38 See Mary Graham, Democracy by Disclosure: The Rise of Technopopulism (Washington 
DC: Governance Institute Brookings Institution Pre s, 2002); James T. Hamilton, 
Regulation through Revelation: The Origin, Politics, and Impacts of the Toxics Release 
Inventory Program (Cambridge University Press, 2005); Arthur J.P. Mo!, Environmental 
Reform in the Information Age: The Contours of Informational Govemance (Cambridge 
University Press, 2008); Virginia Haufler, 'Di closure as Governance: The Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative and Resource Management in the Developing World', 
Global Environmental Politics 10 (2010), 53-73. 
39 Archon Fung/Mary Graham/David Weil, Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of 
Transparency (Cambridge University Pres , 2007), 48-49. 
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traditional international law on 'informational' governance and the ne\ 
dome tic one: the' hadow of the tate', which loom behind the l~bel-
ling and reporting requirement impo ed by dome tic law on pnva~e 
actor i mi ing on the international plane. When elf-report , pubhc 
condemnation and blackli ting of tate doe not help to bring ~em 
into compliance with international law, tiff er enforcement mecham m 
are largely lacking. 
A econd difference i that ever more national legal tern are 
acknowledging citizen ' right to information - with or without a con-
titutional foundation. A growing number of tate have an op~n-~cce 
policy which contain tandard element uch a proacti e pubhcat10~ of 
document on web ite , procedure for granting acce , and rev:ie\, 
mechani m in the ea e of refu al. In contrast, international orgamza-
tion generally do not acknowledge the individual rights of per on to 
acce their document .40 In chapter 14, Antonio Tzanakopoulo argue 
that it i impo sible to transpo e the right to acce . informa~on to the 
international legal order becau e thi , ould require the eXJ tence of 
courts with compul ory juri diction.41 However, the ab ence of comp~-
ory judicial review would not eem to categorically exclu~e the a~ph-
cation of an individual right to information to ~temat~onal 
organization . ome dome tic freedom of information regune till _do 
not provide for full-fledged external judicial revie\ but onl e tabh h 
agency-internal over ight mechanism . That path ha al o been taken 
by the World Bank. ection 17 belm (p. 593) will demon trate that 
the international human right to information can al ~ be . rea onabl ' 
applied to international organization . Once thi exten ion 1 ac~epted, 
you have minimized one structural difference between dome tic and 
international law. 
Third, the international legal system lacks h o core con titutional 
features: it is not a product of direct democratic procedure ( ee below 
section 11) and the international institutions po e neither a Y tern of 
42 th" . rt t 
checks and balances nor a separation of power . But 1 imp_o_ an 
'constitutional' difference does not as uch pre ent the tran ferabihty of 
40 Megan Donaldson/Benedict Kingsbury, 'Power and the Public: The 'ature and ~ff~ 
of Formal Transparency Policies in Global Governance In titution ', chapter 19 ID this 
volume. · th. 
41 Antonios Tzanakopoulo , 'Transparency in the Security Council', chapter 14 ID 
1 
volume. 
42 That is, they do not necessarily allocate the governance function of law-making, 
executive action and adjudication to separate organs. 
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transparency requirements to the international realm; to the contrary, it 
encourages it. In a State constitutional system based on the separation of 
powers, the tripartite system of government created by a State constitu-
tion provides for a certain amount of disclosure of government informa-
tion.43 Additional transparency mechanisms are less urgent in such a 
setting than they are in an institutional context where the accountability 
~echanism inherent in the separation of powers and formal democracy 
1s absent. As Joseph Stiglitz has pointed out: 'the less directly accountable 
a governmental agency is to the public, the more important it is that its 
actions be open and transparent.'44 
A final aspect is that for reasons of practicability, swiftness and 
uniformity, the foreign policy of even democratic States (including 
legal action such as treaty-making and participation in law-making 
within international organizations) has traditionally been entrusted to 
the executive branch and basically exempted from democratic and judi-
cial oversight. The US Supreme Court justified this as follows: '[t]he 
nature of transactions with foreign nations, moreover, requires caution, 
and unity of design and their success frequently depends on secrecy and 
dispatch.'45 Foreign policy has been concomitantly more intransparent 
than domestic policy.46 
However, probably in all democratic States, there has been a clear 
trend towards dismantling the foreign-affairs prerogatives of the execu-
tive branch and towards more intense parliamentary involvement and 
tighter judicial scrutiny. The traditional 'bifurcation' between 'inward' 
and 'outward' action of States is eroding because interior and foreign 
policy (and law) can no longer be neatly distinguished ('world internal 
43 Antonin Scalia, 'The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes', AEI Journal on 
Government and Society, March/ April (1982), 14-19, 19 criticizes the 'obsession that the 
first l_ine of defense against an arbitrary executive is do-it-yourself oversight by the public 
and '.ts surrogate, the press. ( . .. ) [M]ajor exposes of recent times ( ... ) owe virtually 
nothmg to the FOi but are primarily the product of the institutionalized checks and 
balances within our system of representative democracy. This is not to say that public 
access to government information has no useful role - only that it is not the ultimate 
guarantee of responsible government': 
44 Joseph Stiglitz, 'On Liberty, the Right to Know, and Public Discourse: The Role of 
Transparency in Public Life', in Matthew J. Gibney, (ed.), Globalizing Rights, The 
45 
Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1999 (Oxford University Press, 1999), 115-156, 155. 
US Supreme Court, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 US 304 
( 1936), 319, approvingly quoting the report of a Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
from 15 February 1816, empha is added. 
46 On the related aspect of confidentiality in diplomacy, see below section 15.1: 
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law'):'- The blurring of the line bet\veen domestic and forei'?1 _affai_r ~a 
it elf undermined the po sibility of neatly and rea onably d1 tmgmshmg 
a phere of dome tic law and politics, which mu t be tran parent, from 
an international sphere in which transparency seem neither fea ible nor 
warranted.48 At the ame time, the approximation of the statu and 
function of transparency in domestic and international law and global 
governance in and of it elf reinforces that blurrine . 
To conclude, while structural and substantive difference between 
dome tic and international law prevent a tran fer of the concept of 
tran parency as it tands from the national to the internatio~al 
leYel, not all pecific feature of international law trictly rule out its 
application. To the contrary, the rootedne and refinement of trans-
parency-ha ed compliance mechanisms facilitate the operation of a~ 
mternational transparency norm. And the absence of direct democratic 
mechani ms and a eparation of power actually under core it u eful-
ne and de irability. Without attempting to downplay the difference 
ben een domestic and international law and governance, it seem fair to 
a • that 'national and international tran parency y terns repre ent 
Yariations on a single governance theme.'
49 
5. The Object of International Transparency: What Exactly 
Should Be Transparent? 
In the sphere of politics, different actors have different views as to what 
exactly needs to be transparent. The reason is that they typically have 
diverging perceptions as to the relevance ( alience, usability and com-
prehensibility) of information.50 In the context of internati~nal law 3:°d 
global governance, relevant information would seem to be. mformatlon 
relating to those political decisions, procedures, rule , actions and the 
mode of functioning of the transparency obligees discussed below 
(pp. 549-553). It is in this context that Luis Miguel Hinojosa Martinez 
47 Jo t Delbriick, 'Prospects for a "World (Internal) Law"? Legal Develo~ments in a 
Changing International System', Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 9 (2002), 
401-431. "d 
4 Alasdair Roberts, Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in the Information Age (Cambn ge 
University Press, 2006), 173. 
49 Fung/Graham/Weil, Full Disclosure 2007 (n 39), 150. 
50 Gupta, 'Transparency under Scrutiny' 2008 (n 1), 5. 
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has usefully distinguished between documentary, decision-making and 
operational transparency.s 1 
In order to bring about meaningful global transparency, the informa-
tion given must not only be relevant in the aforementioned sense but 
accurate and practically accessible (physically available, financially 
affordable, intellectually comprehensible) to the recipients.s2 
Transparency also requires giving reasons for action taken or not 
taken by the transparency-obligee. With regard to legal acts, this obliga-
tion is inherent in the rule oflaw because it is a precondition for any legal 
scrutiny of the lawfulness of the act.s3 Within a framework of deliber-
ative democracy, every policy should be not only justifiable or justified 
vis-a-vis specific addressees but publicly justified because '(t]he political 
process of justification itself shapes in several ways the nature and 
validity of the reasons that officials give.'s4 Here public justification 
appears as a proxy for rightness, justice or legitimacy. From a construc-
tivist perspective, the right to obtain a justification has been touted as the 
normative core of all human rights.ss 
To conclude, in concrete terms, global transparency may relate to a 
host of activities and documents of international organizations and of 
other forms of inter-State cooperation. A reasonable measurement of 
global transparency might require that international actors maintain 
websites, and publish the legal acts they produce, their budget, and 
annual activity reports. A different matter is access to deliberations, 
drafts, and working documents whose publication is more than the 
final decisions subject to countervailing considerations, see section 15. 
Through documentary, decision-making and operational transparency, 
the international actors' decision-making processes and the outcomes of 
51 Luis Miguel Hinojosa Martinez, 'Transparency in International Financial Institutions', 
chapter 4 in this volume. 
52 See Mark Bovens, 'Information Rights: Citizenship in the Information Society', Journal 
of Political Philosophy 10 (2002), 317-341, 330. 
53 For example, see Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ 2010 o. C83/ 
47, 20 February 2010 (TFEU), art. 296(2): '[ l]egal acts shall state the reasons on which 
they are based'; Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 401 (DSU), art. 12(7): 'the report of a panel shall set 
out the ( ... ) basic rationale behind any findings and recommendations that it makes'. 
54 Amy Gutmann/Denis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge: Belknap, 
1996), 100. 
55 Rainer Forst, The Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice 
( ew York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 
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d d -a.luated 
tho e proce e can in principle be b erved, interprete :1° 
by outsider , but different con ideration appl , to the vanou item . 
6. The bligee of Tran parency: \\Th I ( r h uld B ) 
Tran parent? 
· nt have been the la 
In international law, tran parency requireme .th th rip· 
governance tool to monitor the compliance of tates wt J e fp_re 
( ul i1 1 ention ru e mterna· tion of international regime m t atera con . • . h 
d d ) Th. b ok matnl · e amtn t tional organization , oft tan ar · 1 h 
tran parency of tate a induced by international la, in th e daptll r 
( h t 2 b , Jutta Brunne an en addre ing environmental matter c ap er h -
Hey chapter 3 by Jona Ebbe on), internati nal taxation ( apte~ , 
' · G fi) human right a n 1 by Carlo Garbarini and eba ttano aru • rf 
(Chapter 10 by Cosette Creamer and Beth · imm n ), . " ~r 
(Chapter 13 by Orna Ben- aftali and Roy Peled) and non-pr hferati n 
(Chapter 15 by Mirko os ai). . . 
A different question is the tran parency of international organ~= · 
· · ummanz tions. A standard textbook on international organization . 
the trend: '[ ]ince the 1990 , international organization have 10 rea · 
ta p ible ingly accepted the need to make their deci ion a tran paren . 
and to offer the general public a much acce a P ible to mfo_rmati n 
f th · t· •
56 Thi phenomen n I e. am-concerning the work o e orgamza ion. . . . . n 
ined in detail in the chapter on international finan 1al tn tltuti 
. . . . M rt ' ) the \ rr ( hapter 5 b · (chapter 4 by Luis Miguel HmoJO a a mez , 
Panagioti Delimat is), the WHO (chapte~ 11 b ' Emil ' Bru~mm r a~d 
Allyn Taylor) the UN ecurity Council (chapter 14 b ntoni 
Tzanakopoulo~), international adjudication (chapter 1- b · Th re 
eumann and Bruno imma) and more generall in the hapter n 
global governance institution (chapter 19 b Megan Donald n and 
Benedict Kingsbury). 
o specific chapter is devoted to the EU, w_ho e ~n paren · rule 
meanwhile re emble a full-fledged dome tic regrme. in e ~ 99~: artl le l 
of the Treaty on European Union (TE ) peak of a mon tn whi h 
decisions are taken as openly a po ible', and the European\ hite Pa r 
on Governance (2001) highlighted 'open go ernan e' a 
56 Henry G. Schermer / iels M. Blokker, International Inslitutional La,.. (Dordrecht: 
Martinus ijhoff, 5th edn, 2011), 255. 
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principle of governance.57 Several novel provisions were enshrined in the 
2007 Lisbon Treaty58 in order to make Union governance more open and 
transparent. Under article 10(3) TEU '[d]ecisions shall be taken as 
openly and as closely as possible to the citizen.' Article 11 TEU reads: 
'l. The institutions shall, by appropriate means, give citizens and repre-
sentative associations the opportunity to make known and pub-
licly exchange their views in all areas of Union action. 2. The 
in_stitutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue 
with representative associations and civil society. 3. The European 
Commission shall carry out broad consultations with parties concerned 
in order to ensure that the Union's actions are coherent and 
transparent.'59 The new and comprehensive article 15 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) foresees public legis-
lative proceedings and access to documents. 60 Moreover, the individual 
and general right of access to documents has the status of a fundamental 
European right (article 42 Charter of Fundamental Rights). The EU 
Transparency Regulation spells out the conditions of that right.61 All 
legal acts must give reasons (article 296 TFEU) and all legal acts must be 
published in the Official Journal (article 297 TFEU and article 13 of the 
Transparency Directive). These detailed and far-reaching transparency 
rules, which have been basically established and expanded in only the 
pas_t twenty years, demonstrate how far a supra-State transparency 
regune can advance. However, despite these reforms, criticism about a 
57 
EU, European Commission, European Governance: A White Paper, COM{2001) 428 
final, 25 July 2001, ection II. 
58 
Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing 
59 
the European Community, OJ 2007 o. C306/0l, 17 December 2007. 
Emphasis added. 
60 
TFEU, 2010 (n 53), art. 15: 'I. In order to promote good governance and ensure the 
participatio~ of civil society, the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall 
conduct their work as openly as possible. 2. The European Parliament shall meet in public, 
as shall th_e Council when considering and voting on a draft legislative act. 3. Any citizen 
of the Umon, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a 
Member State, hall have a right of access to documents of the Union institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies, whatever their medium, subject to the principles and the conditions 
to be defined in accordance with this paragraph' (emphasis added). 
61 
EU, Regulation (EC) o. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of30 
May 2001 Regarding Public Access to Documents, OJ 2001 No. 1145/43, 31 May 2001 
(EU Transparency Regulation). See Frank Riemann, Die Transparenz der Europiiischen 
Union: Das neue Recht auf Zugang zu Dokumenten von Parlament, Rat und Kommission 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2004). 
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Se~ond, business actors pursue activities in their own interest, their 
pnmary role being to m~e money and generate welfare by providing 
goods and employment; m contrast, it is the State's raison d'etre to fulfil 
tasks in the public interest. Third, business is not endowed with specific 
powers whic~ re_semble State powers, namely the power to unilaterally 
enact law w_h1ch is formally binding on natural persons who have not (at 
least not directly) consented to it, and the institutional and physical 
means to enforce it (police, courts, bailiffs). 
The ~peci~ case of actors established in legal forms provided by 
domestic. pnvate law (shareholder companies, anonymous societies, 
and th~ like). but entrusted with the performance of public functions 
(tasks m the mterest of the general public) has already been discussed 
under the heading of compensatory transparency (see above section 3.3). 
~eyon~ those q_uasi-p~blic economic actors, even ordinary business is 
mcrea_smgly_facmg societal expectations to satisfy certain 'public' stand-
ards, mcludrng_ transparency requirements. Chapter 18 by Larry Cata 
Backer deals Wlth these business actors. The human rights issue as to 
wheth~r ~e fundamental right to information is opposable to business 
actors is discussed below in section 17.3. 
The new ?bligees of international transparency obligations (besides 
tates) mamfest a novel functionality of transparency in the interna-
tional legal' system. 'Transparency for governance' has been supple-
mented by transparency of governance', to rely on a distinction made 
by R?n~d ~itchell.~5 Transparency for governance entails those policies 
~nd ms~tutions designed to alter the behaviour of the regulatees. Under 
mternational law, these are mainly the individual States which are 
suppo~ed to be brought into compliance (through monitoring, self-
r~portm~, et~.). _In cont~ast, 'transparency of governance' is those poli-
c~e_s and mstltutions designed to empower a polity (in our case, a global 
citizenry) to observe the actions of the 'regulators'. In international Jaw 
the regula~ors a~e ~ose States acting collectively by adopting treaties and 
~ollabor~trng Wlthm treaty regimes and organizations as well as those 
mternational organizations which issue secondary law and take 
measures. The new 'global transparency' signifies an extension from 
65 Jutta Brun~ee/~llen Hey, 'Transparency and International Environmental Institutions', 
Chapter 2 m ~s volume, relying on Ronald B. Mitchell, 'Transparency for Governance: 
The Mechanisms and Effectiveness of Disclosure-based and Education-based 
Transparency Policies', Ecological Economics 70 (2011), 1882-1890, 1882. 
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tran parency for governance only to tran parency of global o ·eman 
it elf a , ell. 
7. The Beneficiarie of Tran parency: \i 
Information? 
hould lain 
Becau e tran parency i alway relational , it matter who i and wh 
hould be the rightful recipient of a relevant pie e of infi rmation. In 
cla ic inter- tate law, the international tran parency obligati n ha ·e 
benefited tate . For example, in di armament Ja, (chapter 15) the 1 l 
cheme are de igned to en ure that informati n on arm i mad 
available to other tate but not to the general publi (m luding tenti I 
terrori t ). Al o, variou international environmental regim require 
exporting tate or export firm operating under the JUri di ti n o a 
tate party to make certain information about a traded pr du t (e. . 
genetically modified organi m , hazardou , a te) available t im rtin 
tate o a to obtain from the importing tale the latter' pri r 
'informed' con ent (PIC).66 It would be an altogether di erent m tter 
to a k for the PIC of the affected population . 
The variou chapter of thi book re eal that the legal benefi 1arie o 
transparency depend on the area of international law. The ir 1 
beneficiarie of transparency would eem to be expand in , r pure inter-
late tran parency i increa ingly being een a in uffi ient. n t p 
of traditional transparency, ocietal actor are a king fi r tran paren 
vis-a-vi them elves, and the international in titution to a ertain . tent 
re pond. Individual a tran parency beneficiarie are mo t pr min nt 
in the field of international adjudication. Court and tribunal re arl • 
communicate with individual without an mediation thr ugh tate . 
Individual are in the direct focu of international rule and pra t1 e n 
judicial transparency.67 Thi development might well eviden ea gr " · n 
perception that the ultimate constituency of international law and p Ii -
tic is human beings and that the e form a na cent glo al ivil 1 
and thi apart from being organized into nation- tate . \ ·e hav a 
po itive feedback loop here becau e granting more informatt n t th 
general public in turn helps to constitute uch an (imagined) gl bal 1 iJ 
66 Jutta Brunnee/Ellen Hey, 'Transparency and International Emironm ntal In tJtuu n ', 
chapter 2 in this volume with further reference . 
67 Thore eumann/Bruno irnma, 'Tran parency in International d1udi tJ n', h r 
17 in this volume. 
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society. NGOs symbolize just such a 1obal c·vil . 
formal sense represent a gl b 1 . _g 681 society but do not in any 
. o a citizenry B ·d · c · 
mternationa1 organizations a d . . es1 es m1ormmg NGOs, 
mation to and thereb b n regimes should also grant more infor-
1
. y ecome more transpar t . , . d 
par iaments (not only to d th en v1s-a-V1s omestic 
war s e exec f b h form important links to ·t· 69 u ive ranc es of States), who 
c1 1zens. 
8. Transparency as a Power Shifter 
The emergence of international tran . . 
both a result and a promote f i~re~cy as pnnc1ple and practice is 
legitim_acy. Working on the t:;s~ ~ s i.n power an~ per~eptions of 
(Francis Bacon) 70 gov h at knowledge itself is a power' 
, ernments ave t d. · 11 
the arcana imperii.11 Raison d'etat diet:: ittona y a_ttempted to guard 
and leaving neighbours (notabl 'foe ') ~d ~e keepmg of State secrets 
plans and projects Intr y s m ignorance as to the ruler's 
statecraft. Consisti~g of aanspa~en~y has long been an accomplice of 
pro1ess10na1 bureau th 
preserved this ally in th c f cracy, e modern State 
A e 1orm o the Amtsgeh · · (' ffi 
ccording to Max Web th '[b] . ezmms o ce secret'). 
tends to exclude the pub~:· t eh.d ~reaucrat1c administration always 
· · . lC, o 1 e its knowled d · 
cnt1C1sm as well as it can. ( ... )The ure . ge an its action from 
exert their effects far beyond [th~ ar!a:wer mtere~ts of bureaucracy 
secrecy. The concept of th " ffi of funct10nally motivated 
b 
e o ce secret" is the "fi . . 
ureaucracy and few thin s it d f, . spec1 c mvention of 
that early phase of interna~i ale ends _so fanatically as this attitude.'72 In 
the international legal sch~:r ;r!a;zations, namely the Cold War era, 
a euter espoused similar reasoning 
68 
Anne Peters, 'Dual Democracy' in Klabb /P 
(n 63), 263-341, 315-318 For' th ders eters/Ulfstein, Constitutionalization 2011 
· . · e nee to <listing · h b mternallonal organizations with ws etween the transparency of 
69 Grigorescu, 'Transparency of Interr~i:;;nto the general _pu~lic ~nd towards GOs, see 
For transparency vis-a-VIS· d . . mental Organizations 2007 (n 7) 641 
'Th 
omesllc parliaments All ' · 
e Legitimacy of Global G • see en Buchanan/Robert O Keohan 
( 
ovemance Instituti • E h. . e, 
70 
2006), 405-437, 431. ons• t ics and International Affairs 20 
Francis Bacon, Mediationes Sacrae (I God). 597), eh. 11: Of Heresies M4 ( ·th d 
11 'T • WI regar to 
alee away a government's preserve on in£ . . 
to release, and talce away a fundam tal ormallon, _and its preserve on when and what 
n Information 2010 (n 10), 30. en bulwark of its power'. Birkinshaw, Freedom of 
Max Weber/Guenther Roth/Claus Wittich (eds 
York: Bedminster Press, 1968) eh XI. B .), Economy and Society, vol. 3 ( ew 
992. ' · · ureacracy, section I 1B (Administrative Secre ) cy. 
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with regard to organization that commanded global reach. For him, 
organization needed to pre erve an inner phere of e recy in order to 
pre erve their autonomy from the member tate , and thu their p litical 
power.~3 
The probl m i the mix of politi al p wer combined with intran -
parency of the ba e of that power: '(j]u ta ecrecy protec ( ... ) abu 
of power, o it al o give tho e , ho empl , it uc e full· more power, 
thu increa ing their u ceptibility to c rruption, and in tum a till 
greater need for ecrecy.'"14 Tran parency trie to break thi viciou cir I:, 
thu functioning a a power- hifter, a 'emancipatory tran paren ·'.' 
Tran parency empower out ider be au e it equip them ,,;th informa-
tion and thereby create a precondition for holding power-holder to 
account. 
However, tran parency doe not empower all takeholder to an equal 
extent. Rather, more tran parency lead to a power hift from tho 
actor , ho know the right people to tho e , ho po e the kno ,·-how 
and re ource to collect, analyze and interpret the data. On average, the 
political actor of the Fir t World (abo e all tate , but al o G and 
bu ine e ) can better exploit the opportunitie for influence that are 
created by improving (international) tran parency.-
6 
Legal ob erver 
hould not only acknowledge that ' the battle for tran paren . ·• 1 a 
' truggle for power'77 but hould think about ho, to level the pla ,ng 
field for that battle. 
-3 Megan Donald on/Benedict King bury, 'Power and the Publi : The ature and Eff 
of Formal Tran parency Policie in Global Governance In lltution ', chapter 19 in th. 
volume, analyzing Paul Reuter, 'Le droit au ecret et le in tituuon intemauonal ', 
Annuaire franfa,s de dro1t international 2 ( 1956), 46-65, 61. Reuter relied on the 
in titutional theory of international organization , thus conceding them a proper life', 
and drew an analogy between the nece ity of 'rntimitl for individual a " 11 for 
social group and in titution . 
74 Sissela Bok, ecrets ( ew York: Pantheon, 19 2), 106. 
75 Mol, 'The Future of Transparency' 2010 (n 62), 135- 136. 
76 Megan Donaldson/Benedict King bury, 'Power and the Publt : The 'ature and Effi 
of Formal Transparency Policies in Global Governance In titution ', chapter 19 in this 
volume. See also Kristin M. Lord, The Perils and Promise of Global Transparenq. \\'h 
the Information Revolution May ot Lead to ecurity, Democracy, or Peace (Albany: 
State University of ew York Pre , 2006), 125; Robert , Government crecy 2006 (n 
48), 194-195. 
n Ann Fiorini, 'Conclusions', in Ann Fiorini (ed.}, The Right to Know: Transparency for an 
Open World ( ew York: Columbia University Pre , 2007), 34 . 
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9. Transparency and Shifting Perceptions of Legitimacy 
While the exercise of political power has always needed legitimacy (being 
~ccepted by those who are governed and deserving that acceptance) for 
its su tenance, throughout history the traditional relationship between 
tran paren~ and legitimacy has been reversed. In the early days of 
st~tehood 1t was exactly the intransparency of governance which con-
stituted a ource of (religious or quasi-religious) legitimacy for the 
rulers.
78 
ecrecy constituted the 'mystery' (arcana-mysteria) of the 
tate. An ~~ra of sacre~ess surrounded the State, just as it did 
the church. Up to the eighteenth century, the intransparency of the 
tate was deemed a perfectly legitimate and even necessary component 
of g~vernance. The. terms for political offices such as 'secretary of state' 
(derived from Latin secretum, meaning 'secret') or Geheimrat (in 
German, Geheimnis likewise means 'secret') manifest this outlook. so 
With the on et of the Enlightenment, philosophers began to denounce 
tate __ ec~ecy, though not necessarily in a liberal spirit.81 In his essay 'On 
Publmty (1790), Jeremy Bentham declared that 'Secrecy is an instrument 
of conspiracy; it ought not, therefore, to be the system of a regular 
government.' 
2 
Jean-Jacque Rousseau suggested that all citizens be 
'con tantly under the public eye'83 and that office-holders should wear a 
uniform o that they could never be anonymous as they went about their 
daily live .
84 
uch projects of surveillance were ultimately totalitarian.85 
78 
Bok, Secrets 1982 (n 74), 172-173. 
79 
Ernst H. Kantorowicz, 'My teries of the State: An Absolutist Concept and Its Late 
Mediaeval Origins', Harvard Theological Review 48 (1955), 65-91. Mystery also had 
the meaning of'prerogative', or 'handicraft', of kings (ibid., 68). On the parallel between 
church ecrecy (arcana ecclesiae) and State ecrecy (arcana imperii), see Bok, Secrets 
1982 (n 74), 172. 
80 
Lucian Holscher, Offentlichkeit und Geheimnis: Eine begriffsgeschichtliche Untersuchung 
zur Entstehung der Ojfentlichkeit in der friihen Neuzeit (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1979), 7. 
81 
ee Michel Foucault, 'L'oeil du pouvoir', in Michel Foucault, Dits et ecrits JI, 1976-1988 
~Pari : Gallimard, 2001), 190-207. On Foucault see also Oma Ben-Naftali/Roy Peled, 
How Much ecrecy Does Warfare eed?', chapter 13 in this volume. 
82 
Jeremy Bentham, 'On Publicity', in Michael James/Cyprian Blamires/Catherine Pease-
Watkin (eds.), The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham: Political Tactics (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 2001), 39. 
83 
Jean-Jacque Rous eau, The Government of Poland (Willmoore Kendall trans.) 
84 
(I~dianapolis: Hackett, 1985), eh. XII: The Military System. 
Ibid., eh. XIII: Plan for a Sequence of Official Promotions Embracing All Members of the 
Government. 
8s C .. 11 ntica yon Benthamite surveillance Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth 
of the Prison (Alan M. heridan trans.) ( ew York: Pantheon Books, 1977). 
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In hi Perpetual Peace (1795),86 if only as a thought experiment, 
Immanuel Kant u ed transparency (Publicitat) as a te t of legitimacy: 
'(a] ll action affecting the right of other human being are contrary to 
right and law if their maxim is not compatible with their being made 
public.' 7 For John tuart Mill, publicity (transparency) wa beneficial 
b au e it can 'compel deliberation and force everyone to determine, 
befor he act , what he hall say if called to account for hi action .' 
uch reflection have generated the perception that government ecrecy 
i not proper a uch but rather su pect; intransparency no longer lends 
legitimacy to political in titutions but undermine it. 
The interdependency between transparency, power and legitimacy 
implie that once political power i exerci ed by international organiza-
tion , they then face imilar challenge a tates. In order to pre ent the 
corruption of that power and acquire legitimacy, they need to become 
(more) tran parent. It i therefore hardly urpri ing that tho e interna-
tional organization which first experienced legitimacy crises - notably 
the E 9 and international financial institution in the 19 0 and 
1990 90 - reacted by enacting transparency mea ure . The 'legitimacy 
pre ure'91 on these organization led to the introduction of tran par-
ency policies in order to regain ( or feign) legitimacy. The relatively novel 
international criminal courts and tribunals face pecific legitimacy prob-
lem a well. Their existence and judgment are often conte ted by 
certain group in po t-conflict societies. Thi explain why the e court 
Immanuel Kant, Zurn ewigen Frieden {Stuttgart: Reclam, 19 4), appendix II: \'on der 
Einhelligkeit der Politik mit der Moral nach dem tran cendentalen Bcgriffe des 
iiffentlichen Recht : 'Alle auf da Recht anderer Men chen bezogene Handlungen, 
~ deren Maxime ich nicht mit der Publicitat vertragt, sind unrecht'. 
8 Ibid., 'ein Experiment der reinen Vernunft'. 
John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Represe11tative Government (South Bend: Gatewa •, 
1962), 214. 
9 
See above: section 5, text with nn 57-61. 
90 Thoma Blanton, 'The Struggle for Opennes in the International Financial In titution ', 
in Fiorini (ed.), Right to Know 2007 (n 77), 243-278. ee al o the 2005 tud on public 
acce to information undertaken by seven financial and national in titution m five 
different countrie by Catherine Musuva (ed.), Behind Closed Doors: Secrecy in 
International Financial Institutions (Cape Town: Institute for Democracr in South 
Africa and the Global Transparency Initiative, 2006). The re ults howed a 'generall • 
high level of opacity surrounding the disclosure of information related to lFI '(ibid., \'i). 
91 Philipp Dann, 'Der Zugang zu Dokurnenten irn Recht der \: eltbank: Ko mopolitische 
Tendenzen im Internationalen Verwaltungsrecht?', Die Verwaltung 22 (2011), 
313-325, 316 . 
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and tribunals typically engage in outreach policies which seek to render 
dear and understandable their activity to the populations concerned 92 
_otabl~ ~e World Bank and the WTO have compelled member Sta.tes 
or aid-rec1p1ents to ~s~a.blish transparency policies. These organizations 
have spawned the cnt1c1sm that while pressuring their clients to become 
more _tra~sparent they have remained intransparent themselves.93 The 
organizations were thus compelled to abandon that self-contradictory 
~tance o as to become credible. For example, in 2010 the World Bank 
~troduced a Policy on Access to Information,94 which has been called a 
small revolution'.95 
10. The Value and Functions of Transparency 
Transparency has both an instrumental and an intrinsic value. It is a tool 
to support performance and increase the rationality and accountability 
of governance, but at the same time it is bound up with values such as 
democracy, rule of law, integrity and trust. The positive connotations of 
tr_ansparency do not warrant a na1ve belief in 'the catalytic power of 
d1sdos~e ( ... ) [that] if only the facts were made public, justice would 
follow. However, the commitment to transparency manifests norma-
tive convictions, and voluntary transparency sends a political signal 
about the e.
97 
One question of this book is whether the value and 
functions of governmental transparency also justify international 
transparency. 
10.1 In Domestic Law and Governance 
In _or~er to an.swer that question, we must first briefly recapitulate the 
obJectives of domestic' transparency. These are enumerated in the 
preamble of the Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official 
Documents (No. 205) of 2009. This Convention is a good starting point 
92 Thore /8 s· • . . eumann runo unma, Transparency in International Adjudication', chapter 
17 m this volwne. 
93 
On this aspect, in particular see Panagiotis Delimatsis, ' Institutional Transparency in the 
WTO', chapter 5 in this volume. 
94 
WB, 'World Bank Policy on Access to Information', 1 July 2010, http://documents. 
worldbank.org. 
:: Dann, ' Recht der Weltbank' 2011 (n 91), 313-325, 313. 
97 
Roberts, Government Secrecy 2006 (n 48), 232. 
Lord, Global Transparency 2006 (n 76), 17. 
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b au it neap ulate an international consensus on the merits of 
tran parency,98 '[c]onsidering the importance in a pluralistic, demo-
ratic iety of tran parency of public authoritie ; considering that 
e.·er i e of a right to acce s to official document : (i) provide a source 
of mi rmation for the public; (ii) help the public to form an opinion on 
the tate f ociety and on public authorities; (iii) foster the integrity, 
effi i ncy, effectivene and accountability of public authoritie , so help-
ing affirm their legitimacy ( ... ).'99 Let u look at the key terms one by 
one. Fir t, onvention o. 205 evoke a democratic society and mention 
accountability. The explanatory reports pell this out: '(t]ran parency of 
public authoritie i ( ... ) an indicator of whether or not a ociety i 
genuinely democratic and plurali t, oppo ed to all form of corruption, 
capable of critici ing tho e who govern it, and open to enlightened 
participation of citizens in matter of public intere t.'
100 
The links 
heh een tran parency and democracy a well a to accountability will 
be di cu ed below (sections 11 and 12). 
e ond, Convention No. 205 peaks of official documents a a ource 
of information and a means to forming an opinion. Indeed, the lack of 
information, like any form of artificially created carcity, give ri e to 
rent . For example, politicians can exploit their control of information 
to reward media persons by confidential di do ure , and thi may al o 
be u ed by tho e same politician to di tort that information.
101 
Tran parency can counteract thi phenomenon. 
Third, Convention No. 205 seeks to improve the integrity, efficiency 
and effectiveness of public authoritie . In fact, intran parency provide 
the opportunity for specially intere ted group to exerci e greater S\·.,.ay 
ince the e groups will offer rewards to office-holder for granting them 
information (and the concomitant greater influence).
102 
Thi ituation 
creates a conflict of interest for the office-holder and ri ks undermining 
the office-holders' integrity. 103 Needles to ay, bribery and corruption 
are not in the public interest. Also, o as to maintain ecrecy, the circle of 
98 Convention o. 205, 2009 (n 17). The Convention i not yet in force, but no principled 
obstacle seems to prevent the attainment of a sufficient nwnber of ratification . 
99 Ibid., preamble. 
100 Ibid., explanatory report, in the commentary on the preamble, para. I. 
101 Stiglitz, 'On Liberty' 1999 (n 44), 133-134. 
102 
Ibid., 132-33. 
103 For a general treatment, see Anne Peters/Lukas Hand chin (eds.), Conflict of Interest in 
Global, Public and Corporate Governance (Cambridge Univer ity Pre , 2012). 
560 ANNE PETERS 
those involved in decision-making is greatly circumscribed, which weak-
ens the quality of decision-making. 104 
Fourth, the Convention's explanatory report points out that 
'[t]ransparency of public authorities is a key feature of good 
' 105 F.fth th C · ' 1 governance . 1 , e onvent1on s exp anatory report states that 
'[t]he right of access to official documents is also essential to the self-
development of people and to the exercise of fundamental human 
rights.' Indeed, governmental transparency is to some extent a question 
of social justice because it is a precondition for the meaningful exercise 
of both political and social rights. Without access to governmental 
information, the citizens' capacity to make rational choices and to 
draw up a rational life-plan is seriously hampered. 106 Along these 
lines, the Indian right-to-information campaign used the slogan: '[t]he 
right to know is the right to live.'107 Based on all those considerations, the 
Convention's preamble concludes that 'all official documents are in prin-
ciple public'. 
10.2 In International Law and Governance 
The book identifies similar rationales of transparency at work in interna-
tional law and for purposes of global governance as in the domestic 
sphere. It is here too that the cluster of functions relating to account-
ability, participation and democracy is to the fore. For example, in 
international environment law, Jonas Ebbesson finds that transparency 
is seen as a precondition for the effective participation of civil society 
actors in environmental governance. 108 In the area of disarmament and 
non-proliferation, according to Mirko Sossai, the involvement of NGOs 
in the 'de facto monitoring' of the relevant international treaties displays 
'dynamic reasons for transparency: the aim is not only that of building 
104 Stiglitz, 'On Liberty' 1999 (n 44), 137. See also the UK, Your Right to Know: Freedom of 
Information, Cm 3818, December 1997, para. 1.1: ' (U]nnecessary secrecy in govern-
ment leads to arrogance in governance and defective decision making'. 
105 Convention o. 205, 2009 (n 17), explanatory report, commentary on the preamble, 
para. 1 (emphasis added). 
106 Bovens, ' Information Rights' 2002 (n 52), 326. 
107 Shekar Singh, 'India: Grassroots Initiatives', in Fiorini (ed.), Right to Know 2007 (n 77), 
19-53. 
108 Jonas Ebbesson, 'Global or European Only?: International Law on Transparency in 
Environmental Matters for Members of the Public', chapter 3 in this volume. 
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onfidence among tate parties but also of encouraging democratic 
. h d bl. . ' 109 over 1g t an pu 1c crutmy. 
A in dome tic bureaucracies, transparency is sought to maintain the 
integrity of the international administrations and prevent conflict of 
intere t. Thoma Cottier and Michelangelo Temmerman relate how 
tran parency reforms in the WIPO have been employed in reaction_ to 
an in titutional crisi that was triggered by bad management and which 
led t bia ed recruitment and political favouritism. 
110 
Good governance - notably in the form of the previsibility of a leg~ 
etting a well a legal certainty - is vital for economic actors and their 
bu ine deci ions, for instance for investors. These considerations have 
motivated tran parency requirements in international investment la\ · 
Julie Maupin points out that transparency is a core component of the 
treaty-ha ed fair and equitable treatment standard relating to the content 
111 
of la\ and regulations introduced by the host tate. 
Third, transparency is also introduced in order to further the effec-
ti ene and efficiency of international legal regimes. The welfare argu-
ment in favour of transparency and information- haring have _been 
mo tly rai ed in the .financial sector, first with regard to the ordinary 
market participants and then with regard to the World Bank it elf. It has 
been empirically shown (though a direct causal relationship ha be~n 
difficult to establish) that a financial crisis is more likely when financial 
112 L . Mi I liberalization takes place in the absence of transparency. ws gue 
Hinojo a Martinez explains that transparency is valuable for the \ orld 
Bank a a developmental institution 'because the design and impleme~-
tation of its policies will receive input from local communitie that will 
make its projects better adapted to the conditions in the field and thus 
more effective.' 113 
109 Mirko Sossai, 'Tran parency as a Cornerstone of Disarmament and on-proliferation 
Regimes', chapter 15 in this volume. 
110 Thomas Cottier/Michelangelo Temmerman, 'Transparency and Intellectual Property 
Protection in International Law', chapter 8 in this volume. 
111 Julie Maupin, 'Transparency in International Investment Law: The Good, the Bad and 
the Murky' , chapter 6 in this volume. 
112 Tara Vishwanath/Daniel Kaufmann, 'Toward Transparency: ew Approaches and 
Their Application to Financial Markets', The World Bank Research Observer ~6 
(2001), 41-57, 48-49, with further references linking the ri e of ucces ful finanaal 
markets to the access to information. 
113 Luis Miguel Hinojosa Martinez, 'Transparency in International Financial Institution ', 
chapter 4 in this volume. 
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On the other hand, some aspects of transparency seem peculiar to 
international law. For example, in a landscape of 'proliferated' and 
disconnected international courts and tribunals, the admission of indi-
vidual judicial opinions can perform a beneficial systemic function by 
allowing a court (which wants to decide a legal question in a way differ-
ent from other courts or tribunals) to refer to pre-existing dissenting 
opinions. An international judge or arbitrator thereby enters into a 
judicial dialogue instead of silently treading their own path. Such refer-
ences are apt to strengthen the overall coherence of international law by 
demonstrating that the legal solution was already in the system. 114 
Finally, there are areas of international law in which transparency 
seems less needed than in the domestic sphere. For example, as Steven 
Ratner shows, the credibility of the International Committee of the Red 
Cro s (ICRC) has not been undermined by its intransparency. On the 
contrary, the ICRC's credibility has been enhanced. The fact that the 
organization gives the assurance to warring parties that it will not 
publicize what it sees, e.g. in detention centres, helps persuade those 
parties to allow access to such sites, and thus generally allows the ICRC 
to fulfil its role as a guardian of international humanitarian law. 115 
However, differences in the functionality of transparency at the domestic 
and international levels are mitigated by the fact that obviously the 
various goals of transparency are not necessarily always in alignment 
with each other and that their importance may vary depending on time 
and context and on all levels of governance. 
11. Transparency and Democracy: Domestic and International 
Democracy needs transparency. The classic statement in this regard was 
tendered by James Madison: '[A] popular Government, without popular 
information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a Farce or a 
Tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: 
[A]nd a people who mean to be their own Governors must arm them-
selves with the power which knowledge gives.' 11 6 Transparency is 
114 Observation by Thore eumarm. 
115 Steven Ratner, 'Behind the Flag of Dunant: Secrecy and the Compliance Mission of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross', chapter 12 in this volume. 
116 James Madison, 'James Madison to W. T. Barry', in Philip B. Kurland/Ralph Lerner 
(eds.), The Founder's Constitution (University of Chicago Pre s, 1987), eh. 18, docu-
ment 35, writings 9: 103- 109. This remark was made in the context of establishing a 
State-funded educational system (I thank Roy Peled for this information). 
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obviou ly a conditio sine qua non for the informed consent of the 
overned. It i critical for uncovering abu e and defending interest · 
Tran parency facilitates control and crutiny. It allows the addres ee of 
(national or international) norm and decision a well as the public at 
large to evaluate the rationality of measures and to a sess whether there 
i a legitimate aim behind them. Tran parency may thus protect against 
b th illegality, and overreaching and elf-dealing, by governing actor · 
Furthermore, tran parency is apt to encourage public participation. 
Tho e who are uninformed are not induced to participate acti ely, thu 
leaving the field to groups with pecial intere ts and di torting demo-
cratic proce e .117 Finally, intran parency give political incumbent a 
di tinct advantage over their political rivals in democratic proce e and 
thereby prevent democratic renewal. 
The democratic rationale of transparency a ju t sketched out figure 
prominently in mo t international hard and oft rule pre cribing 
dome tic tran parency for States. 11 8 In an important ea e, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights de cribed the positive-feedback loop 
beh een tran parency and acce to information on the one hand, and 
democratic control on the other: ' [D]emocratic control by ociety, 
through public opinion, foster transparency in tate activitie and 
promote the accountability of tate officials in relation to their public 
activitie . Hence, for the individual to be able to exerci e democratic 
control, the tate must guarantee acce s to the information of public 
interest that it holds. By permitting the exerci e of thi democratic 
control, the tate encourages greater participation by the individual in 
th · f , ,J 19 e interests o 0C1ety. 
In the absence of formal representation of a global citizenry, election 
to a global parliament, and voting on global political affair , interna-
tional law and governance is not currently democratic in the traditional 
117 Stiglitz, 'On Liberty' 1999 (n 44), 135- 136; Panagioti Delimatsi , ·~ . titu?on:11 
Transparency in the WTO', chapter 5 in this volume, with regard to part1c1pation m 
WTO activities. 
118 For instance, see the Convention o. 205, 2009 (n 17), preamble; OA , Inter-American 
Democratic Charter (Declaration of Lima), AG/RES. I (XXVIll-E/01 ), 11 eptember 
2001 , art. 4; OAS, General Assembly, Access to Public Information: trengthening 
Democracy, AG/RES. 2252 (XXXVI -0 /06), 6 June 2006; , ECO OC, Economic 
Commission for Europe, Report of the First Meeting of the Parties, Addendum: Lucca 
Declaration, ECE/MP.PP/2/Add.l , 2 April 2004, para. 2. 
119 lACtHR, Case of Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile, Judgment of 19 September 2006, 2006 
Series C o. 151 , para. 87 (emphasis added). 
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sense of democracy within a nation-State;120 however, the international 
legal system might have a proto-democratic quality in which transpar-
ency plays a role. Any assessment of this matter must proceed from the 
real state of contemporary democratic life, not from any unattainable 
ideal, and observers and reformers should be prepared to accept new 
types of ~emocracy without diluting the concept of democracy too 
much. With these two considerations in mind, the question is whether 
and how transparency can become democratically relevant for interna-
tional actors. 
I submit that transparency can alleviate the democratic deficit to be 
found in both international organizations and international law-making 
proce se .
121 
Transparency is 'crucial to providing a reasonable sem-
blance of democracy at the global level of decision making'; 122 in other 
words, it is a constitutive element of a new kind of global democracy. 
Transparency is clearly no full substitute for formal democratic pro-
ces es allowing global citizens to vote for international rules and elect the 
officials of international institutions; however, it can work for more 
democratic control and greater accountability. With regard to the IMF 
and the World Bank, Jo eph E. Stiglitz opined: ' [W]hen direct democratic 
accountability is lacking, alternative accountability mechanisms must be 
sought Of the e, openness and transparency are the most important.'123 
Another interesting aspect is the relationship between the parliamen-
tarization of international organizations and their degree of transpar-
ency. Empirical research found that when parliamentarians are involved 
in the decision-making of an international organization such as the 
EU, the governments of the member States will be ready to release 
120 Peters, 'Dual Democracy' 2011 (n 68), 263-341. 
121 F . . k . . or a p1oneenng wor on mternahonal democracy and international transparency, see 
Ann Fiorini, The Coming Democracy: New Rules for Running a New World 
(Washington DC: Island Press, 2003). See also Hale, 'Transparency, Accountability 
and Global Governance' 2008 (n 8), 73-94, 73 and 91. 
122 
Fiorini, Coming Democracy 2003 (n 121), 207. 
123 
Joseph E. Stiglitz, 'Democratizing the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank: Governance and Accountability', Governance 16 (2003), 111 - 139, 133. Stiglitz 
continues: '( I)t is not just that they are fundamental to democratic processes. Public 
scrutiny will put a check on the most abusive practices. It can increase the Likelihood 
that the policies that are in the general interest - not just in the special interest of, say, 
the financial community- are pursued. To me this is the key practical reform. The !MF, 
no less than democratic governments, should be subjected to Freedom of Information 
acts' (ibid., 133). 
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information - probably because they know that the public will receive 
that information anyway through the parliamentarians.
124 
We thus find 
a p itive-feedback loop here as well - while more transparency is a 
pre ondition for democracy, more democracy in the form of involving 
parliament will in turn increase an organization's transparency. 
Theorie of deliberation and reflexive democracy are apt to under-
re the importance of transparency for democracy and serve as 
guideline for reform. Amy Gutman's and Denis Thompson's book 
on deliberative democracy contains a chapter entitled 'The Value of 
Publi ity'. 125 The authors write: '[ t]he reasons that officials and citi-
zen gi e to ju tify political actions, and the information necessary to 
assess those reasons, should be public. This principle of publicity is a 
,126 I . fr th. fundamental requirement of deliberative democracy. t 1s om 1s 
per pective that the 'deliberative' and 'participatory' process of rea-
on-giving, of deliberation itself, shapes the objective and to ome 
e tent define the legitimacy of the policy and thus furnishes a type 
of procedural legitimacy to the measures. Although this strand ~f 
thought focuses on 'publicity' rather than on transparency, the basic 
idea applie : transparency (just like publicity) contributes 'to the 
de irability of the policy itself.' 127 Transparency (like publicity) give 
citizen not only the opportunity to decide for themselves on the 
merit of the reasoning that led to the policy, but also impro e their 
chance of understanding the reasoning that led to the policy; if not, 
citizens ' remain disconnected'. 128 
It ha also been pointed out that political debate today has become far 
more reflexive, i.e. that the word of public authorities and scientists is no 
longer law. It is a style of debate no longer restricted to resul~s . and 
conclusions but to assumptions, starting points and presuppo 1tton · 
There is thus a permanent need for background information. Hence 
tran parency obligations and concomitant 'information right are not 
only important because they support the traditional process of demo-
cratic steering and accountability, but also because they can serve a a 
,129 p· all if tool in helping to expand the reflexive nature of democracy. m y, 
one believes that in post-modern democracies ' information (rather than 
representation by way of vote) has become one "currency of 
124 Grigorescu, 'Transparency of Intergovernmental Organizations' 2007 (n 7), 642. 
125 Gutmann/Thomp on, Democracy and Disagreemen/1996 (n 54), eh. 3. 
126 Ibid., 95. 127 Ibid., 103, with regard to 'publicity'. 
128 
Ibid., 103. 
129 Boven , 'Information Rights' 2002 (n 52), 325. 
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d "' 130 th ·  d f h . . 11 emocracy , en an mcrease transparency o te mternat1ona egal 
system has specific democratic value. 
International law-malting is already to some extent deliberative and 
reflexive, and increased transparency would make a contribution here. In 
the interest of further democratization of the international legal process, 
transparency should be improved further.131 In practice this would mean 
that rule-making sessions in international organizations or conferences 
of the parties should combine public (live-streamed through the inter-
net) and in camera sessions, with publicness as the basic rule accompa-
nied by due exceptions for deliberation (see pp. 574-83), and for possible 
security, business and privacy reasons. This would include, maybe only 
with a time-lag, the publication of legislative drafts, too. The facilitation 
of technical access to the internet in disadvantaged world regions should 
be a high priority of UN politics in order to improve democratic inclu-
siveness. Transparency in itself does not bring about democracy -it is 
solely a precondition for democratic procedures. 
12. Transparency and Accountability 
The exercise of political power should entail accountability. 132 Because 
not only States but other transnationaly relevant actors exercise political 
power, these should be accountable to their principals as wel. 133 
Transparency and access to information are necessary components of 
130 Devika Hovel, 'The Deliberative Deficit: Transparency, Access to Information and UN 
Sanctions', in Jeremy Matam Farral/Kim Rubinstein (eds.), Sanctions, Accountability 
and Governance in a Globalised World (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 92-122, 97, 
internal references omited. 
131 Peters, 'Dual Democracy' 20l(n 68), 330. 132 Accountability can be defined as 'a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which 
the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can 
pose questions and pas judgment, and the actor may face consequences' (Mark 
Bevens, 'Analy ing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework', 
European Law Journal 13 (2007), 447-468, 450). Grant and Keohane define account-
ability as the implication that some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of 
standards, to judge whether they have fulfiled their responsibilities in light of these 
standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not 
been met (Ruth Grant/Robert Keohane, 'Accountability and Abuses of Power in World 
Politics', American Political Science Review 99 (2005), 29-43, 29). 
133 On accountability in global governance, see Anne Peters/Til Forster/Lucy Koechlin, 
'Towards on-State Actors as Efective, Legitimate and Accountable Standard Seters', 
in Peters et al., Non-State Actors 2009 (n 63), 492-562, 524-536. 
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an ' fun tioning accountability cheme.134 Tran parency i v~ua~l~ 
b au e it help to aleviate (even if it can never completely rectify) 
the information asymmetry benveen 'agent' and 'principal'. 
Crucialy, accountability requires sanctions or di em_po\ erment 
mechani m . The most common and efective political sanction, namely 
dem cratic election , is lacking on the global plane, and global election 
b · a global citizenry are unfea ible. Therefore, instead ofle?al and formal 
accountability mechani ms, non-legal and informal sanctions are to ~e 
fore, notably political and financial anction as wel as. tho e affe~tmg 
reputation. Ju t like democratic elections, the e anct1on ar~ eith~r 
d · functional or uterly impossible without tran parency. Aga1~ t_ th! 
background, it i unsurprising that the International Law A 0~1at1~n 
declared principle on the accountability of internation~ organization 
(2004) highlight tran par~n~ ·~ both the decisio~-making ~~oce, an~ 
the implementation of mst1tut10nal and operat10nal dec1 10n a · · ·  1 · tion and thu principle of good governance mmternationa orgamza , 
bil. 136 a a principle ecuring their accounta 1ty. . 
Another que tion is to whom the accountability of ~te~nauonal la\ 
and policy-maker , notably the international organization , hould 
extend -to members of specific organizations, to al tate , to a global 
citizenry? One critique is that, although tho e actor are accountable, 
they are accountable to the wrong constituencie . In this conte;t, Ale~ 
Buchanan and Robert 0. Keohane u efuly di tingui h between narrow 
and 'broad' accountability.137 Broad accountability mean not only 
alowing tho e who presently receive the account (the tate , notably 
134 Hety Kovach/Caroline eligan/Simon Bural, 'One V orld Trust (2003): Power with-
out Accountability?', 2002/2003, available at: www.oneworldtrust.org, 3: table, Blage cu 
et al. 'Accountability of Transnational Actor '2009 (n 63), 5. . 
us In a 'democracy, where the citizenry is the principal, an informati~n as~m.etry wil · · · be fuly dialocncal. Thi I al the alway per 1st. Commumcat1ve structure can never o- . . 
more true on a global cale. (Simone Chamber , 'Behind Clo ed Door : Publicity, 
ecrecy and the Quality of Deliberation', The Journal of Political Philosophy 12 
(2004), 389-410, 410). 
136 International Law Association, Report of the Seventy-first Con{er~nce (London: 
International Law Association, 2004), part one, ection one. The pnnciple tate ~at 
'i. !Os should, as a general rule, adopt normative deci_ ions in a ~ublic vot~; 2 . leetm~-
of non-plenary organs should in principle be pubhc unle mappropnate, 3. 0 
plenary organs of an 10 should as a general rule grant through their ~~ of Pr~edu~e 
an appropriate status to Member States, other States, and n~n-tate ~~~ ~ P3:°cular Y 
affected by decisions to be taken or contributing to operatJonal actJ\'ltJe. · Ibid.,_ · . 137 Buchanan/Keohane, 'Global Governance Institutions' 2006 (n 69), e pecial '42, with 
a link to transparency. 
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the member tates of specific organizations) but others (such as NGOs 
and ~opulations) to conte~t the very terms of accountability. The gist is 
that broad transparency 1s needed for critical revision of the terms of bil' >138 accounta 1ty. The broader constituencies should be enabled in 
order ~o obt~in 'the capacity for revising the terms of accountability, 
~nd thi ~eqmres broad transparency: institutions must facilitate positive 
mf~rmat10n externalities to permit inclusive, informed contestation of 
their current terms ~f accountability.'139 Seen in this way, transparency 
become even more unportant for accountability because it can address the accountability mismatch. 
But tran parency also works in the other direction. The institutions 
themselve are aware of the fact that information about them is spread 
thr?u~ NGOs. ~ut th~y do not know exactly what is publicly known. 
T~i~ _wil ~~ an_ mcentive_ to ~void behaviour for which they may be 
cnticIZed. This mechamsm 1s also apt to increase accountability. 
13. Transparency as a Proxy 
Transparency, participation and accountability constitute the tryptichon 
of glo~al. good governance. The frequent mentioning of these kindred 
value m mternational political and legal texts is owing to the expectation 
that transparency wil increase the accountability of the international actors and enhance participation. 
. But is not transparency merely a surrogate, replacing the much more 
difi~ult substantive issues of democracy, good governance, economic 
efficiency,. oci~l justice and the rule of law?141 Is the quest for trans-
parency rusgu1ded because it aims only at the symptoms and hides the 
cause ? Is it 'a triumph of form over results'?142 Does not striving for 
transparency become 'a distraction, diverting time and resources from 
substantive outcomes'?143 Are we merely performing 'rituals of ifi · ', 144 ver cation · Have we erected an 'ideology of transparency' which 
13 Ibid., 428. 139 Ibid., 429. 
140 B h uc anan. and Keohane have caled this a 'productive uncertainty' (Buchanan/ 
Keohane, Global Governance Institutions' 2006 (n 69) 430) 141 , . ' . 
ee_Ha,ufler, D1 do ure as Governance' 2010 (n 38), 70, on transparency as a 'default option. 142 See ibid., 69, on the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 143 G 'T · 
144 upta, ransparency under Scrutiny' 2008 (n J), 4. 
Michael Power, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification (Oxford University Press 1997). • 
T WARD TRA PARE CY AS A GLOBAL ORM 
repla e the true democratic ideal?145 With regard to the private sphere, 
Larry ata Backer point out that tran parency here i a ubstitute which 
'd not ek to directly engage the foundational ideology' of share-
h lder , elfare-maximization (a oppo ed to al o taking into account 
takeholder concern ).146 Tran parency might be 'too soft to create real 
a ountability'. 147 More perniciou even, the focus on transparency 
might prove ounterproductive by conveying a false impre ~ion of 
a ountability, which in turn erve a a pretext for not tackling the 
hard problem and thu ultimately preventing political reform. 
In contra t to the e sceptical voice , Alen Buchanan and Robert 
Keohane ugge t that tran parency can erve a a proxy for the ati_ fac-
ti n of legitimacy criteria.148 The rea on is that it is 'easier for out 1der 
to di cover whether an in titution is not re ponding to demand for 
information relevant for determining whether it is violating it own 
pre ribed procedure , than to determine whether it is in fact vi?la~g 
them.' It i relatively easy to tel whether an international orgamzation 
generate or y tematicaly re trict access to the info~atio~ th~t o_ut-
ider would need in order to evaluate it effectivene . If an m tituton 
per i tently fails to cooperate in making available to outsid~r th~ ~for-
mation that would be needed to determine whether [certam legitmacy 
criteria] are ati tied, that by it elf create a pre umption that it i 
il 't' t >149 eg1 Ima e. . 
There doe exi t the danger that certain type of tran parency wil 
degenerate to 'empty title of legitimacy'.150 But the tran parency di -
cour e i ambivalent and u e of the concept ranges from good faith to 
cynicism. More importantly, the debate on tran parenc_y not onl ' 
'ma ks' other issues behind it but itself reconfigures the reality of global 
4~ Pierre Ro anvalon, La contre-democratie: La politique a /'age de la de!ance (Pari : 
euil, 2006), 262: 'la per pective de la tran parence se ub titue dorenavant a un 
exercice de la re pon abilitc! que l'on a de! e perc! de pouvoir organi er; ele acc_om_pagne 
une orte d'abandon des objectifs proprement politique au profit de la valonsat.Ion. de 
qualitc!s phy ique ou morales ( .. ). Une veritable idc!ologie de la tr3:11 P3!'ence c est 
ainsi peu a peu erigc!e en lieu et place de l'idc!al dc!mocratique de production d un monde 
commun'. 
146 Larry Cata Backer, 'Transparency and Busine in International Law: Governance 
between orm and Technique', chapter 18 in thi volume. , ~ 
147 See Hale, 'Transparency, Accountability and Global Governance 200 (n ), ,4. 
148 See Buchanan/Keohane, 'Global Governance In titution ' 2006 (n 69), 42 · The 
authors' legitimacy criteria are minimal moral acceptability, comparative benefit and 
integrity. 
149 Ibid., 429. 150 Holscher, Ofentlichkeit und Geheimnis 1979 (n 0), 170. 
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governance. The gi t i that transparency is indeed a substitute but a 
necessary one be~ause it r~places, in a global and pluralistic political 
pa~e, the unattamable certitude and conviction about the 'right' inter-
national law ~d policy through a procedural device allowing everyone 
to form ~e1r own opinion on matters of global governance. 
Accompanied by mechanisms of participation, transparency helps to 
hape ~~
1
d revise those matters of global governance through public 
debate. ~or example, transparency in international patent law has 
led to the mvolv~ment of competitors and NGOs such as Greenpeace 
and has thereby 1~proved the balancing of the divergent interests at 
t~e when confernng exclusive rights, as shown by Thomas Cottier and 
M,chelang~lo Temmerman in Chapter 8. The importance of transpar-
e~cy, even if only a proxy for outcomes, is demonstrated by the fact that 
With regard to many international events, such as environmental cata-
trophe or financial sca~dals, the lack of transparency regarding causes 
~nd governmental reactJo~s o\~
2
missions often eclipses the perceived 
importance of the event itself. Japanese information policy in the 
aftermath of the nuclear catastrophe of Fukushima in 2011 is a recent 
example. 
To conclude, w~~e tran parency policies to a certain degree generate 
only an ersatz leg1tunacy and may even at times be counterproductive, 
they more _o_ften eem '_a _reasonab!e initial step>153 towards improving the 
accountability and legitimacy of international law and governance. 
14. Drawbacks of Transparency 
Transparency mu t not be excessive. Too much transparency the 'wrong 
kind' f 154 ' o_ transparency, transparency in the wrong moment, transpar-
ency With. r~ pect to cer~ain contents or towards certain recipients may 
cause political and social problems both in terms of domestic and 
international law as well as regarding governance. 155 The chapters of 
151 
It i~ of cours~ diffi~ult to prove any causal relation between the procedural requirements 
of mformat1on di do ure and substantive improvements (for example in environ-
152 m~ntal policy). (Mol, 'The Future of Transparency' 2010 (n 62), 138.) 
Oliver, What is Transparency? 2004 (n 8), I; Mol, 'The Future of Transparency' 2010 (n 
62), 139. 
153 H ufl •o· I 
154 a er, 1sc osure as Governance' 2010 (n 38), 70. 
155 
Andrea Prat, 'The Wrong Kind of Transparency', American Economic Review 95 
{2005), 862-877. 
From a comprehensive international relations perspective, see Lord, Global 
Transparency 2006 (n 76). 
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thi b k highlight ome typical or po ibly negative effect of too much 
tran parency. 
nalytically peaking, we can fir t of all di tingui h between the 
intrin ically negative effect of tran parency, notably th_e_dange~ po ed 
to the quality f deliberation and countervailing legitimate mtere t 
' 157 · 
uch a ecurity, 156 privacy and bu ine or trade ecret . econd, a 1 
the a e with ba ically all policie , tran parency mea ure have 
their financial co t and may be unfea ible due to time and pace c~n-
traints. Third, tran parency may only be simulated through data-flood~g 
('dr wning in di clo ure'),158 di information and pr~p~ganda, . omething 
which has traditionally played an important role in international rela-
ti ns.159 ma Ben- aftali and Roy Peled cite the example of then U_ 
ecretary of tate olin Powell' peech before the curi_ty Co~cil 
in February 2003 on alleged Iraqi weapon of ma d~truction, which 
persuaded the American public of the need to go to war ~ I~q, altho~gh 
it was gro mi information. 160 However, the remedy ~gam t information 
o erload and di information eem not to be the reduction of transparency 
but rather increa ed tran parency and the u e of filtering ystem to dis-
tingui h hokum from real information. . . 
Tran parency ha been further criticized a undermining tru t. It ha 
been argued that 'exce ive' transparency policie ha~e.not redu_ced but 
even fuelled public di tru t, ultimately becau e of m1 1nformatJon and 
156 Anne Peter , 'Tran parency, ecrecy, and ecurity: Liai on Dangereuse ', in Julia 
Iliopoulo -Stranga /Oliver Diggelmann/Hartmut Bauer (ed .), Rechtsstaat, Fmhe,t 
und icherheit 111 Europa/Rule of Law, Freedom and ecurity in Europ Etat de dro,t, 
liberte et secur,te e11 Europe, Societa Iuri Publici Europae1 vol. 6 (Baden-Baden: 
omo , 2010), 183-243. .gh 
15' For example, ee Agreement on Trade-related A pects of Intellectual Pr~~rt)' Ri ts, 
15 April 1994, 1869 T 299, art. 39. IAEA, Model Protocol Additional to the 
Agreement( ) between State( ) and the International Atomic Energ}' Agency for _the 
Application of afeguards, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected), September 1997, art. 15 requll'e 
the International Atomic Energy Agency to 'maintain a tringent regune to en u_re 
effective protection against disclosure of commercial, technological and mdustnal 
secrets and other confidential information coming to it knowledge'. 
158 Gupta, 'Transparency under Scrutiny' 2008 (n 1 ), 4. , . . 
159 Holzner and Holzner quote a senior official of the EU: (t)he unpression of_ tran ,-
parency is that it is a straight ray oflight. But it can_be imulated b 'a thousa~d nurror · 
(Burkart Holzner/Le lie Holzner, Transparency 111 Global Change: The \ anguard of 
Open Society (University of Pittsburgh Pre , 2006), 102). 
160 Oma Ben- aftali/Roy Peled, 'How Much ecrecy Doe Warfare 'eed?', chapter 13 in 
this volume. 
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m ormatJon ove ow. This VIew seems one-sided because intrans-
~ar~ncy i al o apt to generate distrust. Secrecy is often understood to 
mdicate bad intention , and disclosure is perceived as a sign of trust-
worthine . 
162 
Moreover, in judging whether to place our trust in a 
certain entity or to deny it our trust, we must first have sufficient 
information. With regard to international relations, liberals such as the 
German Karl Heinrich Ludwig Politz realized this as early as the nine-
teenth century: ' ollen Volker unter rechtlichen Verhaltnissen neben 
einander be tehen, und die wechselseitigen Verbindungen des Handels 
und_ de tibrigen Verkehrs <lurch ihr gegenseitiges Zutrauen begrtindet, 
erle1chtert und ge ichert werden; so mufi jedes Volk wissen, wie es mit 
dem andern daran ist. Dies kann nur <lurch gegenseitige Oeffentlichkeit 
b~wirkt werden.'
163 
In contemporary international law with respect to 
di armament, one of the 'es ential functions' of verification is 'to prevent 
any ri k of cheating and to build confidence' - as Mirko Sossai points 
o~t.
164 
o, while greater transparency as such is no guarantee that fewer 
m1sunder tanding will take place and increased trust will ensue, trans-
parency i more often than not perceived to build trust rather than to 
undermine it. 
161 
Ono O' ill A Q · if . ra . e , uest,on o Trust, The BBC Reith Lectures 2002 (Cambridge 
Uruver 1ty Pre , 2002), see especially 70: '[i)f we want to restore trust we need to 
reduce deception and lies rather than secrecy. Some sorts of secrecy indeed support 
deception, others do not. Transparency and openness may not be the unconditional 
good that they are fa hionably supposed to be. By the same token, secrecy and Jack of 
tran parency may not be the enemies of trust'. 162 
Fiorini, 'Conclusions' 2007 (n 77), 339. On trust-building through transparency, see 
Jutta Brunnee/Ellen Hey, 'Transparency and International Environmental 
In titution ', chapter 2 in this volume. In chapter 11 in this volume, Emily Bruemmer 
and 1\'1yn Taylor recall that with respect to the intransparency of an emergency 
comrruttee, WHO found that '[a)lthough confidentiality represented an understand-
able . e(fort to protect the members from external pressures, this paradoxically fed 
susp1c1on that the organization had something to hide' (WHO, Sixty-fourth World 
Health A embly, Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005): 
Report _of the Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health 
Regulauons (2005) in Relation to Pandemic (HI I) (2009), Report by the Director-
General, A64/ IO, 5 May 2011, 16). 
163 
'Should nations coexist in legal relations, and the mutual links of commerce and the 
other traffic be founded, facilitated, and secured through their mutual trust; then every 
peop_le_ must know how it stands with the other. This can only be achieved by mutual 
publicity.' Karl H. L. Politz, Die Staatswissenschaften im Lichte unserer Zeit, vol. I, 
Leipzig 1847, 133 (emphasis added; trans. by this author). See also Holscher, 
Offentlichkeit und Geheimnis 1979 (n 80), 169. 164 
Mirko ossai, 'Transparency as a Cornerstone of Di armament and on-proliferation 
Regimes' , chapter 15 in this volume. 
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n important point is that tran parency measures can be ~ircurn-
·ented: the legal and political actor might hold conclave behmd the 
a ad of the public meeting, keep secret files apart from those that are 
publi , or minimize record-keeping altogether. If such are the fore ee-
able r inevitable consequences of transparency or too ~uch t_rans-
paren in a certain context, in the end the entire policy will be 
rendered ineffective or even counterproductive and thus create yet 
m re intran parency. For example, Luis Miguel Hinojosa Martinez 
predi t enue- hifting for thos~ ensitive negotiations ~n ~e r_egul:-
hon of financial markets, spending cuts, or budgetary pnonties if th Y 
, ·ere to be conducted under constant public scrutiny. He conclude that 
. · · t 'le . e ive di clo ure would likely transfer those negotiations o 
~ rmal and more opaque forums and would eriou ly hamper the role 
f international financial institution as trusted advisor .'
165 
The like-
liho d of uch effects must be gauged by the de igner of uch 
in titution . f 
In the international as in the domestic realm, some type o tr~~ 
th . th ' olitics of spectacle parency may al o engender no mg more an a P . 
in " hich neither the decision-makers nor the public truly engage. In 
mtemational investment arbitration, Julie Maupin give a mixed a e -
ment of the danger of politicization. As for the \:orry ~at tran pare~t 
pr ceedings might "re-politicize" inve tor-state dispute , he re~ard it 
a 'mi placed'; but purely contract-based claims may introduc~ ~erent 
con iderations. 167 Extensive transparency about legal and political pro.-
ce e can bring about an 'ersatz public rea on', a 'plebi citary reason• 
which i shallow or appeals to the worst human instincts. 
168 
But from a 
reali tic tandpoint, modern democracy will alway to some degree 
produce the e effects. . . d the 
To conclude, transparency can be beneficial and pem1c10u , an 
overall effects depend on what is revealed, when it i~ revealed, and to 
, horn. A a governance mechanism, transparency 1s a double-edged 
word. 
16s Lui Miguel Hinojosa Martinez, 'Transparency in International Financial Institutions', 
chapter 4 in this volume. 
166 Roberts, Government Secrecy 2006 (n 48), 236. ad and 
167 Julie Maupin, 'Transparency in International lnve tment Law: The Good, the B 
the Murky', chapter 6 in this volume. 
168 Chambers, ' Behind Closed Doors' 2004 (n 135), 389,393 and 398. 
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15. Transparency and Deliberation: Which Exceptions Are 
Needed and When? 
A c_ore q~estion is to what extent transparency undermines the quality of 
deliberations, becau e deliberation is at the centre of all types of interna-
tional decision-making and setting up of rules, in conferences of the 
parties, in compliance monitoring bodies, or in international courts and 
tribunals, and notably in diplomatic negotiations. 
15.1 Transparency and Diplomacy 
A ~e.lated _aspect is the tra~itional eth~s o_f confidentiality in diplomacy. A 
Bntish diplomat wrote: the old pnnciple that the art of negotiation 
depends . on reliability and confidence is an eternal principle.' 169 An 
aggravatmg factor was that, historically, diplomacy had been an aristo-
cratic affair and to that extent profoundly anti-democratic: 'in the days of 
the old diplomacy it would have been regarded as an unthinkable 
vulgarity to appeal to the common people upon any issue of interna-
tional policy.' 170 
. The m_ore the proce ses of international law move away from the 
diplomatic mode, the more they lend themselves to publicity. This not 
only a~plies to law-making but also to the settlement of disputes. In the 
~950 it_ wa st,ill worth pointing out: '[D]ans son origine la justice 
~ternattonale s affirme par une differenciation des procedes diplomat-
~ques, notamment clans la me ure ou les commissions mixtes diplomat-
1ques se transforment progressivement en commissions arbitrales. II est 
done nature! qu'elle evolue egalement vers des formes et des procedures 
de plus en plus ouverte a la publicite, ainsi que le prouvent notamment 
les statuts des Cour internationales proprement dites.' 17 1 
Moreover, even in the realm of diplomacy, opaqueness has probably 
never been an ab olute value. By the late nineteenth century, govern-
ments realized that they could achieve foreign policy objectives only with 
the support of the domestic public. They therefore attempted to pursue a 
dual strategy: secrecy towards the foreign States, but openness towards 
their people. The German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck understood 
this trade-off but did not say how it was to be attained: '[I]nwieweit 
nun die Geheimhaltung, die diskrete Schonung des internationalen 
169 
Harold icolson, Diplomacy (Oxford University Press 3rd edn 1963) 255 
170 Ib.d 171 ' ' ' ' 
1 ., 168. Reuter, 'Droit au secret' 1956 (n 73), 64. 
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'ertrauen , dem Bedurfni se, die Offentlichkeit rechtzeitig aufzuklaren 
uber den politi chen Gang der Regierung, geopfert werden darf, ist eine 
h\ er zu ent cheidende Frage.' 172 An exten ion of this is the newer 
trategy of 'public diplomacy', which includes the endeavour to persuade 
the foreign public. 
A recent example of a commitment to tran parent diplomacy is the 
limate negotiation . The conference/meeting of the parties of the 
F C and Kyoto Protocol (COP 16/CMP 6), held in Cancun in 
2010, , a explicitly conducted under the heading of tran parency. 
Thi ,. a in line with the pertinent U FCCC guidelines
173 
but wa 
al o pecifically highlighted by the ho ts: the Mexican conference 
pre ident gave 'full commitment to the principle of tran parency 
and inclu ivene . There will be no parallel or overlapping di cus ion 
and I will continue en uring that all po ition are taken into 
a count.' 174 What is at take when making (diplomatic) deliberation 
tran parent? 
15.2 Negative Effects of Transparency 
Han Morgenthau warned again t 'the vice of publicity' in diplomatic 
negotiation : '[i]t take only common en e derived from daily experi-
ence to realize that it i impossible to negotiate in public on anything in 
172 'To what extent ecrecy, the discrete con ideration for international trust, may be 
acrificed for the desire to inform the public timely about the political course of 
government, i a que tion that is difficult to decide.' peech in the 24th e ion of the 
Reichstag of the orddeutscher Bund, 22 April 1869, in Otto von Bi marck, l erke in 
Auswah/, vol. 4 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1968), 334-337, 336; ee al o Ho! cher, 
Ojfentlichkeit und Geheimnis, 1979 (n 80), 168. 
173 The guideline for the participation of repre entative of non-governmental organiza-
tion at meeting of bodie of the United ations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (U FCCC) of March 2003 tate in their introduction that 'the acce and 
participation of ob ervers to the proce s promote tran parency in thi increa ingly 
complex univer al problem'. 
174 UNFCCC, Informal Stocktaking Plenary: tatement by Her Excellency, lr Patricia 
Espino a, COP 16/CMP 6 Pre ident, 8 December 2010. In the same sen e, ee the 
informal meeting of the president, statement of 5 December 2010: '[T)he 1exican 
Presidency will continue to work with full transparency and according to e tabli hed 
United ation procedures'. ee also FCCC, ub idiary Body for Implementation, 
Synthe is Report on Ways to Enhance the Engagement of Ob erver Organization , 
FCCC/SBI/2010/ 16, 19 October 2010, with a view to the 33rd e ion in Cancun, 30 
ovember to 4 December 2010, with propo als for 'en uring transparency, account-
ability and information-sharing' (paras. 16-17 and 26-28). 
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which parties other than the negotiators are interested.' 175 In a judgment 
relating to the Watergate scandal, the US Supreme Court stated: 
'[h]uman experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination 
of their remarks may well temper candour with a concern for appear-
ances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decision-making 
process.' 176 
Therefore, in order to mitigate the negative effects of transparency on 
deliberations, transparency laws and policies will typically contain 
'deliberative exceptions'. For example, in the EU, access to an institutional 
document 'which relates to a matter where the decision has not been taken 
by the institution, shall be refused if disclosure of the document would 
seriously undermine the institution's decision-making process, unless there 
is an overriding public interest in disclosure.' 177 Luis Miguel Hinojosa 
Martinez quotes the World Bank's justification for secret deliberations: 'if 
the view of each ED [Executive Director] is immediately known to the 
public, it may put undue pressure on EDs, and could also politicize the 
Bank's decision-making process' - and above all for those executive 
directors who represent several constituencies.178 
Are deliberation exceptions justified? What exactly are the inhibiting 
effects of allowing non-participants to listen to deliberations? Sissela Bok 
has described these as follows: 179 when deliberating before an audience, 
the deliberants tend to become more inflexible, more radical, and/or 
they lose candour, becoming averse to risky or innovative opinions. 
PS Morgenthau continued: '(T]his impossibility derives from the very nature of negotia-
tion and from the social context in which negotiations generally operate ( ... ). This 
degeneration of diplomatic intercourse into a propaganda match is, then, the inevitable 
concomitant of the publicity of the new diplomacy'. Hans Morgenthau, Politics among 
ations ( ew York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), 431-433. 
n US Supreme Court, US v. ixon, 418 US 683 (1974), 705. 
in EU Transparency Regulation, 2001 (n 61), art. 4(3). Under the IMF Transparency 
Decision of 17 March 2010, the Executive Board of the IMF will not allow publication 
when it may undermine 'the Fund's decision-making process'. On 'deliberative 
information', also see WB, 'World Bank Policy on Access to Information', 2010 (n 
94), section 16 (see Luis Miguel Hinojosa Martinez, 'Transparency in International 
Financial Institutions', chapter 4 in this volume). In the WTO dispute settlement, panel 
and Appellate Body deliberations are confidential (DSU, 1994 {n 53), art. 14(1) and 17 
(10)). On the related working procedures and case law, see Panagiotis Delimatsis, 
'Institutional Transparency in the WTO', chapter 5 in this volume. 
178 See WB, Operations, Policy and Country Services, 'Toward Greater Transparency through 
Access to Information: The Bank Disdo ure Policy', 16 October 2009, accessible via: http:// 
siteresources.worldbank.org, annex B, para. ll . Luis Miguel Hinojosa Martinez, 
'Transparency in International Financial Institutions', chapter 4 in this volume. 
179 Bok, Secrets 1982 (n 74), 175 and 184. 
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Tran parency tempts the participants to rigidity and to posturing, 
increa ing the chances of a stalemate in which no compromise is possi-
ble, or alternatively, of a short-circuited and hasty agreement. To pull 
back from a bargaining position, often done solely for strategic purposes, 
might be interpreted, if done in full view of the public, as giving in to an 
opponent. The public gaze tempts deliberators to bypass creative or still-
tentative idea and leads to premature closure. In sum, the chances for 
collective learning are diminished. 
Concomitantly, the beneficial effect of excluding the public from 
deliberation i that thi allows for fuller consideration of the matter at 
hand. Deliberators dare to express controversial views behind closed 
door , but they also feel a if they have greater freedom to change their 
mind . They can engage in a tentative process oflearning and of as irni-
lating information, con idering alternatives and weighing consequence -
all of which i needed to arrive at a coherent position. In sum, deliberation 
behind do ed doors can proceed through a proces of trial and error, 
through proposal and counterproposal, through persuasion and 
bargaining, and sometimes through threat. This is impo sible with 
pre ure from the public, including that exerted by pecial interest 
group _ iso 
The judicial deliberation and drafting of decision is usually shielded 
from crutiny in the sphere of international adjudication, and the rule of 
variou international court show 'a considerable degree of uniformity' 
in thi re pect. 181 eumann and Simma mention a number of rea on 
why the ecrecy of deliberations in international adjudication is even 
more important than in the domestic realm - notably to prevent govern-
f lli . d 182 ment rom contra ng JU ges. 
In international law-making (treaty negotiation ), an aggravating 
factor of transparency is that the inflexibility and po turing of partic-
ipants as well as the public pressure of dome tic con tituencie or pecial 
interest groups may frequently lead to a complete breakdown of nego-
tiations so that no desirable outcome results. In fact, the e \ ere the 
reasons given by the representatives of the Great Powers at the opening 
of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference: '[OJ pen proceeding would lead to 
premature public controversy, not only within the interested tate , but 
180 fbid. 
181 Thore eumann/Bruno Sim ma, 'Transparency in International Adjudication', chapter 
17 in this volume. 
182 fbid. 
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between the interested nations, render infinitely more difficult the proc-
e s of give and take, so essential to the negotiations, and hinder the 
unanimity of agreement which is vital to success'. 183 
15.3 Positive Effects of Transparency 
The intran parency of the Paris Peace Conference was all the more 
conspicuous as it was only shortly before that American President 
Woodrow Wilson had stated in his Fourteen Points - 'the only pro-
gramme of the world's peace' - that there should be' [ o ]pen covenants of 
peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private interna-
tional understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always 
frankly and in the public view'. 184 This ideal programme for transpar-
ency (one that was not to be realized) had been motivated by a concern 
for international peace and security. At the beginning of the twentieth 
century the European practice of secret diplomacy had contributed to an 
atmosphere of mutual distrust among nations which in hindsight was 
seen as a catalyst for the outbreak of World War I. Gaining ground by the 
end of the war was the idea that democracy and the power of public 
opinion would be an effective means of preventing war. 185 The expect-
ation wa that transparency (public scrutiny) would restrain States from 
concluding treaties which would risk public disapproval, thus making it 
more difficult to cloak activities antithetical to world peace and security 
under the mantle of the law. 186 
Another beneficial effect of a public audience for deliberations is what 
Jon Elster has called the 'civilizing force of hypocrisy'. 187 Publicity 
(transparency) might force law-makers and decision-makers to explain 
183 
Geo Finch, 'The Peace Conference of Paris 1919', American Journal of International 
Law 13 (1919), 159-186, 167. It was based upon this reasoning that the conference 
adopted the rule that the press should be admitted to plenary sessions but not to 
commi sions and committees. In addition, 'upon necessary occasions', the delibera-
tions of the plenary could be closed as well . 
184 
President Wilson in a joint session of the US Congress on 8 January 1918. 
185 
Karl Willhelm Geck, ' Die Registrierung und Vertiffentlichung vtilkerrechtlicher 
Vertrage', Zeitschrift fur ausliindisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht 22 (1962), 
113-211, 122-23. 
186 
Karl Zemanek, 'Geheimvertrage', in Karl Strupp/Hans-Jiirgen Schlochauer (eds.), 
Worterbuch des Volkerrechts, vol. 1 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1960), 633-635, 634. 
187 
Jon Elster, 'Deliberation and Constitution-Making', in Jon Elster (ed.), Deliberative 
Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 97- 122, 111. On the empirical testing 
of that hypothesis, see the text below together with nn 196-199. 
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their po ition with reference to ocially acknowledged norm . ocial 
pre ure will cau e them to base their statements on claims of general 
intere t rather than on selfish appeals. Even if hypocritical, the e state-
ment may till generate better outcomes because the 'bad' arguments 
are officially banned and therefore have much less power to influence the 
de i ion that i ultimately reached. 188 
With regard to international treaty-making, an important aspect is its 
two-level etting. Here, too, transparent treaty negotiations may indeed 
fail to produce a treaty text due to the inhibiting effects stated above. 
HO\ ever, while ecret negotiations might lead to a treaty text, this treaty 
mu t eventually be published; if it then fails to gain the upport of the 
dome tic public, it will not be ratified. Transparency must be carefully 
timed and parcelled so as to avoid this catch-22 situation. 
15.4 Determining the Proper Mix 
The 'deliberation exception' is the most intriguing challenge to the que t 
for transparency becau e here the proponents of intransparency claim 
to further preci ely those objectives which the principal rule of tran -
parency al o eeks to promote, namely enabling and improving deliber-
ation and better decision-making. 189 Unfettered transparency ·would 
work against the rule's rationale. This implies that ab olute tran parency 
i not to be recommended. 
o the problem for institutional de igner is to properly mix the tran -
parent and intransparent elements of deliberation and to adequately cir-
cum cribe the zones and phases of intransparency. When creating do ed 
paces for deliberation it should fir t be kept in mind that the deliberator 
them elves tend to exaggerate the need for intran parency. econd, the i ue 
to ome extent historically contingent. In early parliamentariani m, 
Jon Elster focused notonly on public-versus-private communicative action but contrasted the 
communicative modes of 'arguing' (reason-giving) and 'bargaining' (threats and promises). 
He thought that 'secrecy tends to induce bargaining and publicity to induce argument' (Jon 
Elster, ' trategic Uses of Argument', in Kenneth J. Arrow et al. (eds.). Barriers to Conflict 
Resolution ( ew York: orton, 1995), 237-257, 252). 'Roughly speaking. arguing is better 
than bargaining because of the civilizing force of hypocrisy, and private settings are better 
than public settings because they leave less room for pre-commitment trategies and over-
bidding ( ... ). The real choice, therefore, may be between the second-best and the third-best 
options' (ibid., 250). (Original in Jon Eisler, Arguing and Ba,xaining in Two Constituent 
Assemblies, The torrs Lectures ( ew Haven: Yale Law School, 1991). 
189 For a good expo ition of the problem, see Gutrnann/Thornp on, Democracy and 
Disagreement 1996 (n 54), 114-126. 
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deliberative secrecy was reclaimed for processes for which we nowadays 
deem transparency clearly appropriate, such as parliamentary debates and 
constitution-making. 190 For example, the American Constitutional 
Convention of 1787 deliberated behind closed doors and only presented 
its work to the public when it had a finished product. James Madison, who 
defended secret deliberations in this case, later wrote that 'no Constitution 
would ever have been adopted by the convention if the debates had been 
public.' 191 Today, in an era in which constitution-making is closely moni-
tored and steered by international institutions and thus to a large extent 
'internationalized', such intransparency is inconceivable. For example, the 
European Constitutional Convention of 2004 was not only a public affair 
but actively sought input from the European citizenry. This could however 
not prevent the Constitutional Treaty's ratification failing so that the Treaty 
never entered into force. 
15.5 Empirical Findings 
Finally and most importantly, the granting of 'deliberation exceptions' 
and their exten ion and timing should be based on systematic research 
into this matter. The beneficial and obnoxious effects of transparency/ 
publicity on communicative action have been theoretically modelled and 
empirically tested with regard to numerous deliberations (constitution-
making, treaty-making, decision-making in the EU Council of 
Ministers, 192 and the like). 193 The classic historical study is Jon Elster's 
190 In early parliamentarianism (which began in England in the seventeenth century), there 
was a debate over whether parliamentary debates should be public or closed. The 
common expectation was that deliberations would be hampered by publicity. Secrecy 
was only gradually abandoned. See David Stasavage, 'Open-Door or Closed-Door 
Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining', International Organization 
58 (2004), 667-704, and specifically 688 for further references. 
191 Max Farrand (ed.), The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vol. 3 (New Haven: 
Yale Univer ity Press, 1911), CCLXVII: Jared Sparks: Journal. 
192 David Stasavage, 'Does Transparency Make a Difference? The Example of the European 
Council of Ministers', in Christopher Hood/David Heald (eds.), Transparency: The Key 
to Better Governance, Proceedings of the British Academy 135 (Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 165-179. He finds that the closed-door setting of Council decision-
making has facilitated attempts to strike bargains, for there has been a greater propen-
sity for ' real' deliberation in most secretive settings (such as COREPER and the 
economic and financial committee). 
193 See notably Stasavage, 'Open-Door or Closed-Door?' 2004 (n 190), 667-704, for a 
game-theoretical model on the relative benefits of open-door versus closed-door 
bargaining. Ellen E. Meade and David Stasavage developed a theoretical model of 
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compari on of the public deliberations of the Assemblee constituante 
in France of 1789 and the secret deliberations of the American 
Con titutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787. Elster found that 
the non-public American constitutional debate was of a high quality, 
remarkably free of cant, and grounded in rational argument. In contrast, 
the public debate of the Assemblee were heavily tainted with rhetoric, 
demagoguery and overbidding. 194 With regard to international treaty-
making, Barbara Koremenos has sought to demonstrate that tran par-
ency may often lengthen the bargaining proce s and give interest group 
too much influence on the treaty' design, which might then lead to the 
treaty' rejection by powerful State and even make it irnpos ible to 
achieve outcomes with net social benefit .195 
Jon El ter' aforementioned hypothe is on the 'civilizing' force of 
tran parency ha been empirically tested in the project 'Arguing and 
Bargaining in Multilateral Negotiations'. 196 That project examined con-
ference within numerous international treaty regime (the uclear 
on-proliferation Treaty, the Ottawa Treaty Banning Landmine , the 
tatute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Child Labour 
Convention, and EU negotiations on greenhou e ga emi ion ). The 
re ult of the e ea e studies was that much depends on the subject matter 
deliberation on a three-member committee and te ted it using an original dataset on 
deliberations in the US Federal Re erve Open Market Committee. In 1993 that com-
mittee had decided to release transcript of meeting after a delay of five ·ear . One of 
the re ult was that committee member were indeed less likely to switch their position 
after 1993, i.e. when they knew that their statements and votes woul~ be pub_Lished 
(Ellen E. Meade/David Stasavage, 'Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to D1 ent: 
Evidence from the US Federal Re erve', The Economic Journal 118 (2008), 695-717). 
ee also Jame Fearon, 'Domestic Political Audience and the Escalation of 
International Disputes', American Political cience Review 88 (1994), 577-592. See 
also Motty Perry/Larry amuel on, 'Open ver us Clo ed-door egotiation ', Journal 
of Economics 25 (1994), 348-359, which examines the phenomenon wi~ _no reference 
to international negotiations; Tim Gro eclose olan McCarty, 'The PobtJcs of Blame: 
Bargaining Before an Audience', American Journal of Political Science 45 {2001), 
100- 119; John Fingleton/Michael Raith , 'Career Concerns of Bargainer ', The Journal 
of Law, Economics, and Organization 21 (2005), 179-203; Prat, 'Wrong Kind of 
Transparency' 2005 (n 154). 
194 Elster, 'Strategic Uses of Argument' 1995 (n 188), e pecially 251. 
195 See Barbara Koremenos, 'Open Covenants Clandestinely Arrived at', International 
Theory 5 (forthcoming), giving as one example the negotiations on the tatute of the 
International Criminal Court. 
196 Overview and summary of findings in Cornelia Ulbert/Thoma Ri e, 'Deliberate) ' 
Changing the Discourse: What Does Make Arguing Effective?', Acta Politica 40 {2005), 
351-367. 
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and the institutional context of negotiations. For example, with regard to 
the ICC and child labour, meetings that took place under public scrutiny 
proved to be quite effective. egotiators became aware of their 'social 
re ponsibility'.
197 
In contrast, non-transparent negotiations work better 
in 'mixed-motive games' (when actors have fixed preferences but would 
al o prefer cooperation), for example in European Council summits. 
Cornelia Ulbert and Thomas Risse conclude that the 'public sphere' 
does have the postulated 'civilising' influence on the quality of the debate 
if two conditions are met: fir t, the negotiators must be dependent on the 
subsequent consent or at least approval of their audiences and/or con-
stituencie , for example at the domestic level (as in a 'two-level arguing 
proce '), or in a transnational public sphere in which negotiators feel 
the need to justify and legitimize their positions. Second, the members of 
the audience must be assumed to be neutral at the outset of the process 
(more like a court), which also means that their preferences are unknown 
to the negotiators. 198 
As for the second condition, Thomas Risse hypothesized that once 
negotiators are certain as to the preferences of the audience whose 
consent they require, social norms lose their constraining effect because 
the negotiator need not argue but can simply employ rhetorical devices 
to impre s their audience. If preferences of the principals are known, 
then 'secrecy and negotiating behind closed doors might be the only way 
towards problem-solving, ince it enables speakers to argue "out of the 
box" and to work toward a reasoned consensus without having to fear 
that some principal in the audience might accuse her of "betraying the 
national interest.'" 199 This proposition was tested on deliberations con-
cerning one item in the EU Treaty revision conference in Amsterdam 
from 1996 to 1997 (treating the issue of the EU's single legal personality), 
but it yielded no clear empirical result. 
To conclude, depending on the setting and on certain conditions, 
transparency can have detrimental but also beneficial effects on the 
quality of international deliberations. Deliberations that are partly 
open and partly in camera should attempt to exploit the benefits 
and mitigate the drawbacks of intransparency. For example, any allow-
ance to deliberate behind closed doors might be linked to reproducing 
the pluralism of the public in private by admitting certain 
197 Ibid., 358-359. 198 Ibid., 359. 
199 
Thomas Risse/Mareike Kleine, 'Deliberation in egotiations', Journal of European 
Public Policy 17 (2010), 708-726, 713. 
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takeholder .200 Another idea is to allow participants to conduct pre-
de i ional di cu ion and deliberation in private so long as the mem-
ber of the body then publicly cite the reasons for their individual 
deci ion and vote .201 Transparency in deliberations alway implie a 
trade-off. 
16. The Normative Quality of Transparency 
Thi book' chapter have demonstrated that the (relative) transparency 
of international processe , mechani ms and institutions, and of the 
ub tance of international legal text , is not just a matter of fact but a 
o ial value and yardstick for the way international organization , 
regime and even tran national bu ine s actors202 ought to behave. The 
que tion i whether that political (or moral) standard of tran parency 
ha cry tallized into an international legal norm. Are there pecific h~rd 
or oft legal rule , or i there an overarching international legal pre cnp-
tion for tran parency? Within the traditional framework of ource of 
international Jaw, a legal obligation of transparency can exi t only a a 
treaty-ba ed norm, a customary rule or a a general principle o~ Ja, . 
The chapters of this book have adduced a large number of _mter~a-
tional treaties which prescribe tran parency in different relation h1p 
and on different issue . A well-known tran parency rule applicable in 
inter- tate relations underpins the multiple treaty-ba ed obligation to 
exchange cientific or technical environment-related information among 
tate .203 In the field of international adjudication, Thore eumann and 
Bruno imma have identified a 'con iderable acquis of hard-law 
obligation ' and a 'normative skeleton of an overarching ju~cial trai:1 -
parency principle.'204 With regard to the ecurity Council, Antoruo 
Tzanakopoulos (chapter 14) has argued that the Council' obligation to 
200 Chamber , 'Behind Closed Doors' 2004 (n 135), 390. 
201 ichola John on, 'Open Meetings and Clo ed Minds: Another Ro~d to the 
Mountaintop', Drake Law Review 53 {2004), I l-53, 53, concerning U . law with re P~ 
to agency meetings. Giving reasons provide the meta-transparency di cussed belm in 
ection 18.3. 
202 On the 'outline of a social-norm standard for tran parency' of bu ine actor , ee 
Larry Cata Backer, 'Transparency and Bu ine in International Law: Governance 
between orm and Technique', chapter 18 in thi volume. 
203 See Jutta Brunnee/Ellen Hey, 'Transparency and International Environmental 
Institutions', chapter 2 in this volume. . . . . , 
204 Thore eumann/Bruno Simma, 'Tran parency in lnternatJonal AdJuclicatton, chapter 
17 in this volume. 
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be transparent toward the UN member States is an 'ancillary obligation, 
which is impo ed by the decentralized nature of the system( .. . ). [I]fStates 
have the right to control legality of Council action, then they must also 
have the concomitant (ancillary) right to demand sufficient information 
on which to reach a conclusion.' With regard to international investment 
law, in Chapter 6 Julie Maupin finds that the existence of 'an overarching 
norm on transparency remains to be determined.' 
In any case, there is no general transparency treaty in the manner of a 
domestic freedom of information law. Such a treaty would not make 
much en e anyway because the potential obligees, recipients and objects 
of transparency are much too complex in the international sphere to be 
ummarily regulated. 
The obligation of transparency as customary law would require a 
general practice of transparency accompanied by an opinio iuris. This 
book has demon trated that abundant transparency practices exist and 
that they are expanding. The test question for determining whether this 
practice is conceived as legally mandated is to entertain whether a roll-
back is conceivable; if not, then an opinio iuris might be deemed to exist. 
According to this test, there would seem to be a relevant opinio iuris. 
Finally, it can be asked whether transparency is 'a general principle of 
law' in the sense of article 38(1) lit. c) ICJ-Statute.205 Such a general 
principle can be said to exist only if two conditions are met. First, it must 
be recognized in the municipal laws of States; and second, it must be 
'transposable at the international level.'206 Given the recent proliferation 
of transparency laws all over the world,207 the first condition would seem 
to have been satisfied.208 It is not necessary for every single State of the 
205 
For a good analy is with regard to the Security Council, see HoveU, 'Deliberative Deficit' 
2009 (n 130). 
206 
See Alain PeUet, 'Art. 38', in Andreas Zimmermann et al. (eds.), The Statute of the 
International Court of Justice: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 
2012), MN 250-269, e pecially M 254. 
207 See the references in n 12. 
208 
HoveU is more cautious, concluding that 'it is probably too early to refer to a general 
principle of international law recognizing a right of access to information. Many of the 
relevant enactments are too recent in origin to be able to reflect principles that can be 
said to be integral to any legal sy tern, if certain of those enactments can even be said to 
have achieved the status oflaw at all.' However, she finds that 'the contemporary trends 
in legal systems across the globe are striking, and there are clear indications of the 
gradual evolution of a general principle of international law recognizing a right of 
access to information' (HoveU, 'Deliberative Deficit' 2009 (n 130), 112-113). 
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, ·orld to have enacted a formal freedom of information law, especially 
becau e the current trend will obviously continue. The more difficult 
point i that of transparency's transposability, bearing in mind 'that 
ondition in the international field are sometimes very different from 
, hat they are in the domestic, and that rule which these latter con-
dition fully justify may be less capable of vindication if strictly applied 
, hen tran po ed onto the international level.'209 Currently, structural 
and ub tantial elements which relate to the operation of a rule of 
tran parency are still quite different at both levels of law (see in detail 
above ection 4). o the condition of transpo ability has not (yet) been 
fully met. 
Additionally, a problem of broadness and vagueness arises. The blurry 
features of the concept of transparency are apt to undermine its norma-
tive power a a legally binding rule. With regard to the principle of good 
go ernance, of which transparency forms a part, it has been ob erved 
that in order to be 'legalizable' a concept 'must meet two fundamental 
tructural preconditions: it must be sufficiently preci e to generate an 
obligation and to asse sits implementation, and it mu t have an obligor 
and an obligee. Only if these questions are answered in the affirmative, 
, , C f th ,210 doe it make ense to examine the bmding 1orce o e concept. 
Tran parency a such might indeed fail that test: '[l]'opacite de la tran -
parence est de J'ordre d'illusion; elle pourrait etre source de desillu ion , 
de deceptions. Un droit qui promet trop, qui promet mal, e t voue a 
perdre on autorite, on arne peut-etre.'211 This mean that its vaguene 
a such might render the concept of transparency un uited to function a 
a legal concept, as a binding rule. 
As a result it would eem difficult to argue that transparency i a norm 
' . 212 
of hard international law - and maybe 1t can never become one. But 
thi finding might be of little relevance. Maybe the clas ic boxe , the 
209 JCJ, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. pain) ( 'ew 
Application: 1962), eparate Opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Judgment of 5 
February 1970, JCJ Report 1970, 64, 66 (para. 5). ee al o PeUet, 'Art. 3 '2012 (n 206), 
M 267. 
210 Beate Rudolf, 'I "Good Governance" a orm of International Law?', in Pierre- larie 
Dupuy et al. (eds.), Viilkerrecht als Wertordnung, Festschrift fiir Christian Tomuschat 
(Kehl: Engel, 2006), 1007-1028, 1026. . , 
211 Chri tian Atias, 'La transparence: Exigence politique ou principe de dro1t, Revue 
generale nucleaire 29 (2003), 58-61, 61. . 
212 ee Jonas Ebbe on, 'Global or European Only?: International Law on Tran parency m 
Environmental Matters for Members of the Public', chapter 3 in this volwne, who ee 
merely 'normative fragments' which give 'only limited upport for international law on 
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'sources' in terms of article 38 I CJ-Statute, do not tell us much about the 
state of international law and its power to influence the behaviour of 
internationally relevant actors. As Andrea Bianchi has explained, a 
normative transparency 'principle' (in the sense of a 'connector between 
the law and changing ocial realities') can be discerned213 whatever its 
doctrinal quality. And maybe as importantly, normative expectations are 
growing. 
17. A Human Right to Information as a Companion 
of Transparency 
Within States, transparency (rules on open government) has been 
mainly sought a a question of 'social hygiene' in order to achieve greater 
democratic control and social accountability of governance. Certain 
authors have also e poused a rights-based perspective in which 
'information rights are most of all an element of citizenship'.214 The 
debate on international transparency is bifurcated in a similar but not 
identical way. It derives from both a 'managerial' and a 'rights-based' 
tradition, a Megan Donaldson and Benedict Kingsbury point out in 
chapter 19. In the managerial tradition, transparency is primarily 
intended to erve the efficacy of governance by using information flows 
in all directions. From the rights-based perspective, transparency is 
rather regarded as a tool for protecting the political, social and economic 
rights of citizens affected by global governance.21 5 In chapter 9, this 
perspective is advocated by Jonathan Klaaren, who analyses to what 
extent a potential human right to information might serve as a 'vehicle' 
for transparency. uch a human right would have as a corollary the duty 
to disclose. 
transparency vis-a-vis members of the public'. Alan Boyle and Kasey McCall-Smith 
find 'remarkably little identifiable international law underpinning this rather 
significant' transparency practice of international organizations and treaty bodies 
(chapter 16 in this volume). 
213 Andrea Bianchi, 'Introduction: On Power and Illusion. The Concept of Transparency 
in International Law', chapter I in this volume, section 3, in referring to Andreas Lowe's 
idea of 'interstitial norms'. 
214 Bovens, 'Information Rights' 2002 (n 52), 327. 
215 Roberts, Government Secrecy 2006 (n 48), 194. See the Convention o. 205, 2009 (n 17), 
explanatory report, commentary on the preamble: '(T] ransparency of public authorities 
( ... ) is also e sential to ( ... ) the exercise of fundamental human rights'. 
TOWARD TRA SPARE CY AS A GLOBAL ORM 
17.1 A Positive Right to Governmental Information 
A right to information is enshrined in many domestic constitutional 
order .216 However, this right has been traditionally interpreted as only 
part of the status negativus. In that reading, the right only prohibits the 
government from withholding 'generally accessible' information (nota-
bly information held by entities other than the State). Thus interpreted, 
freedom of information does not confer on individuals a positive right to 
obtain information held by the government. In that construction, the 
human right to information cannot function as a legal basis for claim to 
acce admini trative files, court proceedings or records, and it cannot 
function a a catalyst for the creation of governmental transparency. 
The international and regional human rights covenants also grant 
freedom of information.217 According to their wording, everyone hall 
have the right to 'receive' (or to 'seek and receive') information - but 
the e provisions do not say who the holder of that information i (private 
actor , the tate, or even intergovernmental organizations?). In earlier 
individual communications, the United ations Human Rights 
Committee218 and the institutions monitoring the ECHR219 had initially 
interpreted the right to information in the aforementioned 'liberal' and 
limited sense. 
216 For example, in the case of Germany, Basic Law, art. 5(1); for witzerland, Federal 
Con titution, art. 16. The United States First Amendment to the Constitution encom-
pas e the right to access information and ideas (US upreme Court, Richmond 
ewspapers v. Virginia, Decision of2 July 1980, 448 U 555 (1980)). See for an overview 
of the constitutional tatus of freedom of information Roy Peled/Yoram Rabin, 'The 
Constitutional Right to Information', Columbia Human Rights Law Review 42 (2011), 
357-401. 
217 UNGA, Universal Declaration of Human Right , A/R.ES/217(III)A, 10 December 194 , 
art. 19; UNGA, International Covenant on Civil and Political Right , A/R.ES/2200 
(XXI), 16 December 1966 (ICCPR), art. 19(2); European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 ovember 1950, 213 
UNTS 221, art. 10; American Convention on Human Rights, 21 ovember 1969, 
1144 UNTS 123, art. 13. 
218 UN, Human Rights Committee, Communication o. 633/1995, CCPR/C/65/D/633, 
1995, 5 May 1999, paras. 13.3-14. 
219 For the narrow interpretation, see ECtHR, Open Door and Dublin Well \ oman v. 
Ireland, Judgment of29 October 1992, Application o. 14234/88, 14235/8 , para. 55. 
See al o ECtHR, Leander v. Sweden, Judgment of26 March 19 7, Application o. 924 / 
81, para. 74; ECtHR, Gaskin v. United Kingdom, Judgment of7 July 19 9, pplication 
o. 10454/83, paras. 51-52. European Commission of Human Rights, X. v. Federal 
Republic of Germany, Decision of 3 October 1979, Application o. 83 3/7 , 228-229; 
European Commi sion of Human Rights, X. v. United Kingdom, Deci ion of 14 
December 1979, Application o. 8575/79, 203. 
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Today that reading is being abandoned in favour of a new and broader 
construction of the provisions, endorsing a positive human right to 
basically access all State-held information. It is in this sense that the 
multi-stakeholder Atlanta Declaration and Plan for Action for the 
Advancement of the Right of Access to Information states as its 'key 
principle' that '[a]ccess to information is a fundamental human right.'220 
In Claude Reyes v. Chile, a pioneering judgment of 2006 concerning 
access to environmental information, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights broadly defined the scope of the right to seek and to 
receive information under article 13 of the Inter-American Convention 
on Human Rights as a 'right of all individuals to request access to state-
held information', with the consequence that there is a 'right of the 
individual to receive such information and the positive obligation of 
the state to provide it.'221 
The European Court on Human Rights has recently scotched its 
previous narrow reading of article 10 of the ECHR. In 2006 the Court 
still opined that the right to receive information 'concerne avant tout 
l'acces a des sources generales d'information et vise essentiellement a 
interdire a un Etat d'empecher quelqu'un de recevoir des informations 
que d'autres aspirent ou peuvent consentir a lui fournir. ( ... ) La Cour 
ob erve egalement qu'il est difficile de deduire de la Convention un droit 
general d'acces awe donnes et documents de caractere administratif.'222 
In 2009 the ECHR recalled that 'Article 10 does not( ... ) confer on the 
individual a right of access' to governmental-held information, and that 
'it is difficult to derive from the Convention a general right of access to 
administrative data and documents.' But then came the obiter dictum: 
' (N]evertheless, the Court has recently advanced towards a broader 
interpretation of the notion of "freedom to receive information" ( ... ) 
and thereby towards the recognition of a right of access to 
220 
'Atlanta Declaration and Plan for Action for the Advancement of the Right of Access to 
Information', 29 February 2008, available at: www.cartercenter.org, adopted, according 
to the website by 'over 125 members of the global access to information community 
from 40 countries, representing governments, civil society organizations, international 
bodies and financial institutions, donor agencies and foundations, private-sector com-
panies, media outlets and scholars, gathered in Atlanta, Georgia from February 27-29, 
2008, under the auspices of the Carter Center'. 
221 
IACtHR, Case of Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile, Order of 19 September 2006, 2006 Series C 
o. 151, para. 77. 
222 
ECtHR, Sdruienf Jihoceske Matky v. Czech Republic, Decision of 10 July 2006, 
Application o. 19101/03, 9-10. 
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information.'223 In a recent Grand Chamber judgment, the Court in 
pa ing a sumed a right 'to receive information in the form of access to 
the public documents concerned', protected under article 10 ECHR.224 
Mo t importantly, the UN Human Rights Commission, in its General 
Comment on the right to freedom of expression and information, issued 
in 2011, interpreted article 19(2) International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (CCPR) as embracing 'a right of access to information 
held by public bodies.'225 In order to give effect to this right, the 
Comment further calls upon parties to 'proactively put in the public 
domain Government information of public interest.'226 This novel read-
ing i borne out by the wording of article 19(2) CCPR: 'to seek ( ... ) 
information and ideas of all kinds'. 
Legal scholarship has furnished arguments for construing the right to 
information as a positive right that in principle encompasses a right of 
access to State-held documents. The purely negative reading of the 
human right to information is inappropriate to the modem information 
ociety.227 Normatively speaking, freedom of information should not 
only be freedom 'from' censorship but a freedom 'to' (in the sense of 
I aiah Berlin).228 The right to access of public documents should be 
regarded as a human right because of its 'intrinsic importance' and 
becau e it is ancillary to freedom of speech. What is the point of freedom 
of speech if that speech is badly informed?229 
Given the important democratic function of citizens' information 
about government, I submit that a positive but not unlimited right of 
access to State-held information is adequate in policy terms. It is also 
fitting under the liberal premise that governmental power is merely a 
n 3 ECtHR, Tarsasag a Szabadsagjogokert v. Hungary, Judgment of 14 April 2009, 
Application o. 37374/05, para. 35 (internal references omitted). See al o ECtHR, 
Kenedi v. Hungary, Judgment of 26 May 2009, Application o. 31475/05, paras. 
40-43 on acce s to documents held by the Ministry of the Interior. 
224 ECtHR, Gil/berg v. Sweden, Grand Chamber Judgment of3 April 2012, Application o. 
41723/06, para. 93. 
ns UN, Human Rights Committee, General Comment o. 34, CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 
September 2011, para. 18. ICCPR, 1966 (n 217), art. 19 had previously been interpreted 
by some commentators as providing only acce s to generally accessible information. 
See Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commmentary 
(Kehl: Engel, 2nd edn, 2005), art. 19, para. 18. 
n 6 Ibid., para. 19. 
227 Bovens, ' Information Rights' 2002 (n 52); Brohmer, Transparenz als Verfassungsprinzip 
2004 (n 25), 225-229. 
228 Ackerman/Sandoval-Ballesteros, 'Global Explosion' 2006 (n 10), 90. 
229 Birkinshaw, Freedom of Information 2010 (n 10), 497-98. 
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delegated power; as a US Court of Appeals put it, all information on 
governmental activity is 'information rightfully belonging to the 
1 '230 If . c . . bi. peop e. m1ormat1on 1s pu 1c property, government is in principle 
obliged to share it. As early as 1985 the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights had stre sed the importance of a free flow of information for 
liberty and democracy by stating that 'a society that is not well informed 
is not a society that is truly free.' 231 To conclude, the human right to 
information should be read very broadly and understood as granting 
access to all State-held information (subject to legitimate restrictions). 
There are practical consequences to acknowledging a human right of 
access to public documents - as opposed to endorsing transparency 
(only) as an 'objective' (not rights-based) principle of governance. The 
difference from the law as it stands would be that access to non-public 
information could not be summarily rejected as falling outside the scope 
of the human right to information. A positive human right of access to 
State-held information would not be overly broad because it would not 
be unlimited. It would still be possible to refuse access on a legal basis in 
order to protect legitimate overriding objectives as long as the refusal of 
disclosure is proportionate to those objectives. With a human rights 
underpinning, the burden of justification in maintaining secrecy shifts 
to the information-holder. Proportionality - or in ECHR terminology: 
'nece sity in a democratic society' - would have to be determined by 
balancing conflicting interests in the concrete case.232 Such a human 
right must also be taken into account when interpreting laws. While a 
right to information would be neither a necessary nor sufficient con-
dition for bringing about transparency, it could surely reinforce any 
trend in this direction. 
230 US Court of Appeals, The Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, Decision of 26 August 2002, 
303 F 3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002), 683. 
231 IACtHR, Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice 
of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory 
Opinion OC-5/85 of 13 ovember 1985, 1985 Series A No. 5, para. 70. 
232 Under US constitutional law, government action that curtails the First Amendment 
right of access to information ' in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information' 
must be supported by a showing 'that denial is necessitated by a compeUing govern-
mental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest' (US Supreme Court, 
Globe Newspaper Co., 457 US 606-07 (1982)). Moreover, '[t]he interest is to be 
articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine 
whether the closure order was properly entered' (US Supreme Court, Press-Enterprise 
II, 478 US 10 (1986)). For constitutionally admissible limitations on the right to 
information under German constitutional law, see BVerfG, 1 BvR 2623/95 of 24 
January 2001, on TV reporting in court. 
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17.2 Opposable to International Organizations? 
In order to function effectively as a vehicle for global transparency, the 
human right to information must be opposable to actors other than 
tate . For example, it might be usefully claimed so as to counter 
\ orld Bank decisions to finance ecologically sensitive developmental 
project . 
International Human Rights in General 
uch an extension of the obligees of the human right to information 
would be in line with the overall rationale of human rights. It is the prime 
function of human rights to protect individuals against public power at 
, hatever level of governance. It is a well-established principle that these 
right must be not only theoretical but real and effective.
233 
It is in line 
with the purpose of human rights that they be opposable not only against 
tate actors but also against inter-State ones such as international organ-
ization , agencies and conferences. 
Ba ed upon that teleological consideration, many people demand that 
international organizations be made addressees of certain international 
human rights obligations.234 Some authors even argue that the e duties 
of international organizations are already part and parcel of interna-
tional law a it stands.235 But there are many open questions, for 
in tance, precisely which organizations are covered, which human rights 
are thus extended, and which types of obligations (to respect, to protect, 
or to fulfil) would fall to international organizations. 
Is there a doctrinal explanation for the engagement of international 
organizations in this way? To begin with, the founding documents of 
233 ECtHR, Airey v. UK, Judgment of9 October 1979, Application o. 6289/73, para. 24. 
234 From a philosophical perspective, see Cristina Lafont, 'Accountability and Global 
Governance: Challenging the State-centric Conception of Human Rights', Ethics and 
Global Politics 3 (2010), 193-215. 
235 For the international financial institutions, see Sigrun I. Skogly, The Human Rights 
Obligations of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (London: 
Cavendish, 2001); Mac Darrow, Between Light and Shadow: The World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund and International Human Rights Law (Oxford: Hart, 
2003); for the WTO, see Holger Hestermeyer, The WTO and Human Rights: The Case of 
Patents and Access to Medicine (Oxford University Press, 2007); for the United ations, 
see Anne Peters, 'Art. 25', in Bruno Simma et al . (eds.), A Commentary to the Charter of 
the United Nations (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2012), M 109-123; and for all 
international organizations, see Anne Peters, 'The Constitutionalisation of 
International Organisations' , in Neil Walker/Jo Shaw/Stephen Tierney (eds.), 
Europe's Constitutional Mosaic (Oxford: Hart, 2011), 253-285, 266-269. 
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~nte~ational organizations must be interpreted and applied in conform-
ity with the human rights obligations of their member States. This 
f?llows from ~e principle of interpretation laid down in article 31(3) 
lit c) of the V1enn~ Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which 
dem~nds that the relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties' must be 'taken into account'. The human 
rights obligations which all members have incurred are 'relevant' and 
'applicable' international rules and must hence be 'taken into account' 
when interpreting the founding treaties, for example the WTO 
Agreement or the Statute of the World Bank. Second, any interpretation 
o~ those founding documents should complement the basic legal prin-
c1p~e ~at the member S~ates are not allowed to forgo their human rights 
~bligations by tran femng competencies to an international organiza-
t10n and that the member States' responsibility continues after any such 
transfer ('no flight into an international organisation').236 In order to 
prevent the obnoxious effects of 'up-zoning' public functions to the 
international level, the member States should retain some residual 
responsibility. But this does not prevent lacunae if the organizations 
themselves are not also engaged. 
To conclude, the systemic interpretation of the founding documents 
of international organizations mandates that the organizations take into 
account the human rights obligations of their member States. This can be 
understood as a weak type of obligation, comparable to the obligation to 
protect. 
Independent of treaty provisions, international organizations might 
be fully bound by those human rights which have passed into general 
. . al 1 237 ~ternation . aw. However, although numerous human rights have 
mdeed acqwred the status of customary law, it is not clear whether their 
'dire~tion' has also changed. The ordinary addressees of obligations 
flowmg from those customary human rights are States. In order to also 
address the organizations as an obligee or duty-holder, it is not the 
substance but the structure which would have to evolve so that the 
relevant obligations were extended to the organizations (besides 
States). It is doubtful whether such a normative evolution can be 
236 S ee ECtHR, Matthews v. UK, Judgment of 18 February 1999, Application No. 24833/94, 
para. 32, with regard to ECHR-member States' 'flight' from obligations under the 
ECHR. 
237 
For the UN, see lain Cameron, 'The European Convention on Human Rights, Due 
Process, and the United ations Security Council Counter-terrorism Sanctions', 
Report commissioned by the Council of Europe (2006), 21. 
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pre umed in the absence of indications to the contrary.238 It rather seems 
that the change of 'direction' would have to be based on a practice and 
opinio iuris. 
The Right to Information 
The 'positive' right to information - the right of access to documents - is 
effective only when it covers all information which is potentially impor-
tant for the life of individuals. This includes information concerning the 
legal po ition of individuals, policy information, and information that 
can a ist them in bolstering their socio-economic position.239 Due to 
international organizations' relative gain in competencies and power, 
the e types of information are increasingly being held not only by States 
but al o by international organizations. So as not to diminish the value 
and function of the human right to information, it must be extended to 
the new information-holders. The Human Rights Committee's General 
Comment on article 19 CCPR is along these lines. The Comment gives a 
functional as opposed to a formalist account of the obligees of that right: 
'Article 19, paragraph 2 embraces a right of access to information held by 
public bodies ( . .. ) [and] may also include other entities when such 
entities are carrying out public functions.' 240 The Comment also points 
out that the right of access to information is opposable to ' emi- tate 
entities'.241 The soft multi-stakeholder law 'Atlanta Declaration' of 2008 
explicitly seeks to bind international organizations to the right to infor-
mation with a view to furthering transparency: '[t]he right of acce to 
information applies to all intergovernmental organizations, including 
the United Nations, international financial institutions, regional devel-
opment banks, and bilateral and multilateral bodies. These public insti-
tutions should lead by example and support others' efforts to build a 
culture of transparency.'242 
238 See in that ense Holger He termeyer who argues that the WTO is bound by human 
rights law because WTO law does not stand in contradiction to that and the WTO has 
not implicitly contracted out (Hestermeyer, The WTO and Human Rights 2007 (n 235), 
99- 102. Schermers/Blokker, International Institutional Law 2011 (n 56), 1004-1005 
discuss not human rights, but customary norms in general: ' in principle', international 
organizations are bound by international customary law unless the rule in question is 
not 'suitable to be applied' to international organizations. 
239 Bovens, 'Information Rights' 2002 (n 52). 
240 HRC, General Comment No. 34, 2011 (n 225), para. 18 (emphasis added). 
241 Ibid., paras. 7 and 18. 
242 'Atlanta Declaration' 2008 (n 220), principle 3, ee also principle 4b). The Atlanta Plan 
of Action states: '1. Intergovernmental organizations - including the United ation 
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17.3 Opposable to Business Actors? 
A different question is whether the international human right to infor-
mation is opposable to multinational corporations.243 In my view, the 
'Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights' - as elaborated by 
the UN special representative of the Secretary-General on the issue 
of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises - correctly rejects any direct applicability of international 
human rights to business actors but postulates the business world's 
moral 'responsibility to respect human rights'.244 With a view to our 
question as to whether transparency is a global standard that is relevant 
for those actor , the special rapporteur's principles as endorsed by the 
UN Human Rights Council245 and incorporated into the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises246 offer a useful framework: 
business enterprises have a responsibility to avoid causing an adverse 
human rights impact through not only their actions but their omissions, 
too.247 Therefore, in the spirit of article 19 CCPR, they must strive to 
grant the general public reasonable access to information about products 
and employment conditions. Parallel to this, States have the 'duty to 
protect' against human rights abuses within their jurisdiction. With 
regard to the human right of freedom of information, this means that 
governmental policies, legislation and regulations must strike a balance 
and all of its bodies, Council of Europe, Organization of American States, African 
Union, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and interna-
tional financial institutes, regional development banks, and trade bodies - and interna-
tional and domestic non-governmental organizations should give effect to the right of 
access to information in accordance with the findings and principles enumerated 
above'. See also de lege ferenda: Stiglitz, 'Democratizing the International Monetary 
Fund' 2003 (n 123), 111-139, 133: '[T)he IMF, no less than democratic governments, 
should be subjected to Freedom of Information acts'. 
243 Roy Peled, 'Occupy Information: The Case for Freedom of Corporate Information', 
Hastings Business Law Journal 9 (2013), 261-301. 
244 UN, Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other 
Busine s Enterprises; John Ruggie: Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United ations 'Protect, Respect, and Remedy' Framework, A/HRC/ 
17/31, 21 March 2011. 
245 UN, Human Rights Council, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises, A/HRC/RES/17/4, 6 July 2011. 
246 OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Paris: OECD, 2011), 
principle IV. 
247 
, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (New York/Geneva: United 
Nations, 2011), principle 13 and commentary. 
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ben een legitimate requests for access and respect for business secrets, 
and that tate mu t al o enforce transparency requirements. 
18. Policy Recommendations 
Becau e the effects of different transparency measures are still uncertain, 
policy recommendations can only be quite general. 
18.1 Qualifying Transparency 
De lege Jerenda, international law and institutions should be rendered 
more tran parent, i.e. the current trend should be ba ically continued 
and reinforced. However, because of the mixed effects of transparency, 
any move in this direction must be qualified. The question is not so much 
whether tran parency should be created but rather how much and when? 
Total transparency of international law is neither appropriate nor real-
istic. Law- and policy-makers should treat transparency as a variable of 
in titutional and legal design. They need to balance the potential neg-
ative effects again t the positive ones. 
Further, a mix of transparent and intransparent elements in institu-
tions, and of transparent and intransparent phases in deci ion-making 
and law-making, must be sought. With regard to the World Bank, 
Philipp Dann speaks of the 'dialectic' of transparency and intranspar-
ency as a precondition for the effectiveness of international administra-
tion.248 So the bottom line is that we need as much transparency a 
required, but as little as necessary. And how much is that? o far, no clear 
method has been established to compare and evaluate the co ts and 
benefits of transparency and to allocate the 'right' measure of it. In any 
case this measure would be sector-specific, for a proper transparency 
framework must be tailored to specific situation : '[T]here can be no ingle 
"how-to" primer on making the best use of what tran parency tool can 
offer for governance.'249 A catch-all transparency design i al o um ar-
ranted because institutions and the zeitgeist (social expectations and 
attitudes about what is proper and due) may evolve, and along with 
them the optimal level of transparency for the international organization 
and procedures. David Stasavage gives the EU as an example: '[R]ather 
than deciding whether practices such as the club model of multilateral 
248 Dann, 'Recht der Weltbank' 2011 (n 91), 320. 
249 Fiorini, 'Conclusions' 2007 (n 77), 337. 
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cooperation are optimal in an absolute sense, it may be more accurate 
to suggest that these secretive forms of international cooperation were 
desirable at one time, but that they are suboptimal today, in an era where 
an increasing number of citizens perceive a bias on the part of their 
t ti. ,250 F" all h . d represen a ves. m y, transparency mec an1sms nee to be accom-
panied by other measures such as participation rights in order not to 
remain an ersatz policy as discussed above. 
18.2 A Presumption of Transparency 
The need for qualifications of transparency can be translated into a legal 
pre umption. Importantly, a (legal) presumption of transparency should 
be acknowledged.251 The Preamble of the Council of Europe Convention 
on Access to Official Documents (No. 205) of 2009252 expresses such a 
presumption with regard to documents held by States: '[c]onsidering, 
therefore, that all official documents are in principle public'. Against the 
background of transparency practices and the assumed opinio iuris, such 
a presumption arguably already exists as a matter of international law, 
and not only with regard to States but as regards international organ-
izations. For the ake of legal clarity and certainty, this presumption 
should also be codified in the constitutions of international organiza-
tions or in rule of procedure.253 
A presumption of transparency means that the non-release of docu-
ments and the closure of meetings to the public must be specifically 
justified on the basis of legal exceptions which have been clearly defined 
250 
Stasavage, 'Open-Door or Clo ed-Door?' 2004 (n 190), 696. 
251 
See Gutmannffhomp on, Democracy and Disagreement 1996 (n 54), 96, explaining the 
basis 'for a presumption in favor of publicity and the authority of claims of secrecy and 
other values that could rebut the presumption'; Stiglitz, 'On Liberty' 1999 (n 44), 152: 
'(B]ecause of the e limitations of legalistic approaches, emphasis must be placed on 
creating a culture of openness, where the presumption is that the public should know 
about and participate in all collective decisions'. Buchanan/Keohane, 'Global 
Governance Institutions' 2006 (n 69), 431: '[T]here should be a very strong but rebut-
table presumption of transparency'. Orna Ben- aftali/Roy Peled, 'How Much Secrecy 
Does Warfare eed?', chapter 13 in this volume, argue that 'the presumption in favour 
of secrecy during wartime should be reversed, requiring government officials to shoul-
der the burden of proof to justify why secrecy is necessary in any particular matter'. 
252 
Convention o. 205, 2009 (n 17). 
253 
Such as in the' ote oflnterpretation' of the NAFT A Free Trade Commission of31 July 
2001, which makes transparency the 'default norm' in all investor-state complaints 
brought under AFTA, chapter ll. See Julie Maupin, 'Transparency in International 
Investment Law: The Good, the Bad and the Murky', chapter 6 in this volume. 
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and circumscribed prior to the fact. These exceptions can only be 
granted by stating the reasons for them publicly; the burden of explain-
ing and of proving the need for secrecy is thereby placed on the institu-
tion it elf - not on those outsiders who request access. 
A legal presumption of transparency furthermore generates the obli-
gation to keep the degree of intransparency as low as possible. 
In titutions must always choose the most transparent alternative to 
afeguard those objectives that conflict with transparency (protection 
of deliberations, space constraints, etc.). For example, instead of com-
pletely closing a meeting or conference, they must allow a limited 
number of observers. 
With regard to the timing of transparency, a less opaque alternative 
would be to delay the publication of documents rather than prohibiting 
publication altogether. But it must be kept in mind that information 
given ex ante can have a completely different value from the one given 
only ex post. For example, the publication of deliberations after a treaty 
text has been adopted by the State representatives is useless with a view 
to influencing the text itself. Still, any subsequent publication of those 
deliberations can impact on a parliament's decision to ratify the treaty by 
better explaining which considerations and factors have in fact led to the 
text's particular composition. 
The presumption of transparency of those holding public power 
(including international organizations) and the protection of a sphere 
of privacy and secrecy for citoyens254 and bourgeois are two phenomena 
that do not in fact stand in contradiction to one another but are rather 
complementary since the non-governmental sphere includes business 
actor who are not subject to the principle of presumptive transparency. 
Global transparency remains committed to a principled public-private 
divide. 
18.3 Meta-transparency 
In transparency is rendered the more acceptable the more it is embedded 
in what Thore Neumann and Bruno Simma (chapter 19) have called 
254 For example by protecting the secrecy of political vote . See Hubertus Buchstein, 
Offentliche und geheime Stimmabgabe: Eine ideengeschichtliche und wahlrechtshistori-
sche Studie (Baden-Baden: omos, 2000). 
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'meta-transparency'. Meta-transparency or ' econd order' transpar-
ency255 mean that the reasons for the intransparency (i.e. whether it is 
necessary at all) and its ub tantive and temporal scope must be made 
transparent. In other words, the questions a to whether, how much and 
for how long intran parency i warranted (e.g. the need for a closed-door 
debate, the circum cription of exceptions, possible reform of the policy) 
must be subject to public debate,256 and it is thereby that an 'element of 
public accountability for the ecrecy it elf' is introduced.257 
In practice thi mean that in the admini trative sphere the authority's 
decision to refu e di do ure of a document must (besides striking a fair 
balance between the conflicting interests) give reasons.258 In other words, 
the (international) bureaucracy' decision to remain intransparent must 
it elf be tran parent in order that it be regarded as legitimate. Second, in 
any dispute ettlement, meta-tran parency means that even proceedings 
closed to the general public for ecurity reasons should end at least in a 
public judgement or award, which is then ju tified in a transparent 
fashion.
259 
Third, general rules (e.g. in treaties) which restrict trans-
parency in any i ue (for example that of international security) should 
be transparent in two re pect : they should be elaborated in an appro-
priate combination of closed and public deliberation, and they should be 
duly published in accessible media.260 
255 
Gutmann([homp on, Democracy and Disagreement 1996 (n 54), 105, use the term 
'second-order publicity'. 
256 
Stiglitz, 'On Liberty' 1999 (n 44), 152. 
257 
Gutmann/Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement 1996 (n 54), 104. 
258 
In this ense, ee EU Tran parency Regulation, 2001 (n 61), art. 9(4): '[A)n institution 
which decide to refuse acce to a ensitive document shall give the reasons for its 
decision in a manner which does not harm the interests protected in Article 4'. 
259 
Cf. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Resolution 1551 (2007), 19 April 2007, 
para. 10.6. 
260 
With regard to dome tic laws, the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly stated 
that 'legislation on official secrecy( ... ) must be clear and, above all, public'. Council of 
Europe, Parliamentary As embly, Fair Trial Is ues in Criminal Cases Concerning 
Espionage or Divulging State ecrets, Resolution 1551, 19 April 2007, para. 10.2. In a 
parallel fashion, the EU Transparency Regulation imposes procedural obligations on 
the EU member States for the treatment of sensitive documents, notably the obligation 
to make public the rules of the institution concerning sensitive documents (EU 
Transparency Regulation, 2001 (n 61), art. 9(6)). Similarly, the Council of Europe's 
comparative study oflegislation on state ecrets in the CoE member State stressed that 
'any administrative or ministerial decrees giving content to more generally worded 
statutes must at the very least be publicly accessible' (Council of Europe Rapporteur 
Christos Pourgourides, CoE Doc. 11031, 25 September 2006, para. 68). 
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Thi approach to transparency ha consequences for 'deep ecret ', 
, ho every existence is hidden from outsiders.261 The classic example for 
keeping a deep secret i the American courts' acceptance of_ the 'Glomar 
Re pon e',262 which was used by the CIA in a ea e concerrung a unken 
Ru ian submarine.263 Here the CIA refused to confirm or deny the 
e i tence of any records or documents pertaining to their pr_e ~ed 
venture to recover the ubmarine. In Chapter 6, Julie Maupm give 
example of deep secrets in the international investment-law r_egirne. 
Meta-tran parency mean that deep ecrets - is ue that the public doe 
not realize it does not know - should be avoided. In the end, only meta-
tran parency provide the necessary means for tran cending the limit of 
tran parency.264 
19. Conclusions 
19.1 Global Transparency 
Thi book has sought to analyze the legal statu , the function , potential, 
legal limit , and legal problems related to transparency in all fields of 
international law. At the same time, the objective " a to place tran -
parency on the agenda of international law re earch. Due to the com-
plexity of the subject, hardly any ready results can be pre ented. O~e 
thing is clear, however: there is a trend toward more _tr~ parency ill 
international governance, as a matter of practice and pnnc1ple. But onl 
in some areas, thi principle has attained the tatu of hard la, · ~he 
human right to information is likely to work a a vehicle for increa mg 
tran parency, especially if it is understood to be oppo able al o to 
international organizations. 
Arguably, globalization has rendered more acu~e the ~ee~ fo~ tr'.'-11. -
parency at the various levels of governance. There 1 nothing ~tru:11c m 
the international legal system which would prevent an apph atlon of 
261 Gutmann/Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement ~996 (n ~), _121. In contrast, a 
ecret is 'shallow' when outsiders know that a piece of mformauon IS ecret but do not 
know what the information is. They have at least the opportunity to challenge the 
keeper of shallow secrets and ultimately decide whether the ecret hould be kept 
(ibid.). • . . ., Cal·" . 
262 See Danae J. Aitchison, 'Reining in the Glomar Re pon e, mvers,ty OJ i,omra 
Davis Law Review 27 (1993), 219-254. 
263 US Court of Appeals, Military Audit Project v. Casey, Deci ion of 4 la ' 19 I, 656 F 2d 
724 (DC Cir. 1981), 729-730. . . 
264 See Gutmann/Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement 1996 (n 54), 127, on pubhci 
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transparency requirements to that field of law. Within international 
organizations and courts and tribunals, transparency partly seems to 
ful_fil similar tasks as in the domestic realm, for example as a power 
h1fter, or as a safeguard of judicial independence. But transparency 
norms can al o (for the better or worse) fulfil particular functions 
peculiar to the international sphere of governance, notably as a kind of 
ersatz legitimacy. The two phenomena in their combination (national 
and international transparency) constitute a form of multilevel trans-
parency which is not simply the result of adding national and inter-
national transparency but which in itself has a new quality - the quality 
of global transparency. 
. The effects of transparency are ambivalent, both 'good' (e.g. by 
mcreasing accountability) and 'bad' (e.g. by disturbing diplomatic nego-
tiations).265 Law- and policy-makers must therefore balance potential 
negative effects against expected positive ones and provide for the proper 
amount of transparency as well as it timely use as adapted to the field of 
international law, the institutional setting, and the observers at hand. 
The question is not whether international law should be transparent but 
to what extent, and what form this should take. Especially with a view to 
enabling and improving deliberation, public and non-public phases 
must be mixed, and the design of uch deliberation exceptions to general 
transparency requirements should build on empirical findings on the 
effects of transparency on the quality of international deliberations. As a 
general matter, the policy recommendation is that any transparency 
norm must be qualified, with due exceptions, but starting from a pre-
sumption of transparency under which the closure of meetings, the 
classification of documents, etc. need a specific justification. Also, the 
exceptions to transparency must be embedded in meta-transparency 
under which the reasons for intransparency must themselves be made 
transparent. 
19.2 Towards a 'Public' International Law 
Ultimately the rise of transparency might manifest a paradigm shift, 
namely international law's shift from a 'private' to a 'public' character. 
There are two different issues implied in this. The first relates to the fact 
265 
As a matter of_ conceptualization, this ambivalence suggests a need to qualify trans-
parency as an mdependent principle, and not only as part of a broader principle of 
global democracy. 
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that traditional international law (being mainly inter-State law) has long 
been conceived as 'private law writ large'.266 Hersch Lauterpacht 
famously stated that 'formally, international public law belongs to the 
genus private law'.267 The background to this qualification is the tradi-
tional distinction between public and private law. But this distinction bas 
been drawn on the basis of different criteria. Public law can be that body 
of law which is binding on the governing authorities, the law that 
constitutes and constrains political power (Herrschaft),268 or that body 
of law which seeks to reconcile claims of individual autonomy with the 
existence of a regime of public authority,269 or that body oflaw intended 
to serve the general welfare (the common good, the 'public' interest) - as 
oppo ed to private law which typically seeks to further private 
autonomy. 'Public' law can be all of these things - but not always. 
De pite this epistemic blurriness, despite the historical and geographic 
contingency of the categories of'public' and 'private law',270 and despite 
the pitfalls of the domestic analogy,271 I submit that the public-law/ 
private-law distinction also has an analytic and normative value for 
international law because that distinction reflects the difference between 
iustitia distributiva (to be realized through distributive policie ) and 
266 Thomas Holland, Studies in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Pre , 189 ), 152. 
Monte quieu described international law as 'le droit civil de l'univers dans le sens que 
chaque peuple est un citoyen' (Charle de Secondat Montesqieu, De /'esprit des lois 
(Geneve: Barrilot & Fils, 1748), livre vingt-sixieme: Des lois dans le rapport qu'elles 
doivent avoir avec l'ordre des choses sur lesquelles elles tatuent; chapitre premier -
idc!e de ce livre). 
267 Hersch Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies in International Law (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co, 1927), 81. 
268 Loughlin, Foundations 20 I O (n 26), I; Dieter Grimm, Das offentliche Recht vor der Frage 
nach seiner Identitiit (Tiibingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 72: Public law is de cribed here 
as the 'Dach al/er herrschaftsbezogenen Rechtsmaterien' ('roof of all law related to 
political authority'). 
269 Loughlin, Foundations 2010 (n 26), 10-11; Armin von Bogdandy et al. (eds.), The 
Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions. Advancing International 
Institutional Law (Heidelberg: Springer, 2010), 5. 
270 On the contingency of the public-law/private-law distinction, see the seminal work of 
Martin Bullinger, Offentliches Recht und Privatrecht (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1968). 
On the reception (or rather re-invention) of the ancient Roman di tinction between ius 
publicum and ius privatum, see Michael Stollei , 'Offentliche Recht und Privatrecht im 
Proze s der Entstehung des modernen Staates', in Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riehm/ 
Eberhardt Schmidt-Afimann (eds.), Offentliches Recht und Privatrecht als wechselseitige 
Auffangordnung (Baden-Baden: omos, 1996), 41-61, 45-51. 
271 It ha been claimed that international law is neither public nor private but ' imply 
"international"' (Ala in Pellet, 'Can a State Commit a Crime? Definitely, Ye !', European 
Journal of International Law 10 (1999), 425-434, 433). 
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iustitia compensativa (as realized in the private sphere and through the 
k t) 272 Th . .th. . mar e . e emergrng transparency norm WI m international law -
with its quality as an enabler and to some extent proxy for accountability, 
participation, and global democracy -is currently strengthening this 
element of global distributive justice in international law. International 
law has in that sense been rendered more like 'public' law. 
In yet another sense, transparency is both the driver and the manifes-
tation of a paradigm shift to 'public' international law. Transparency 
seems indispensable to international practices and rules, because the 
element of transparency supports the qualification of these rules and 
practices as law in the modern sense. The creation of transparency with 
regard to those rules is thus apt to fend off resurgent claims that there is 
no such thing as international law. Lon Fuler has identified various 
elements as necessary (defining) atributes of law: publicity, non-
retroactivity, comprehensibility, no internal contradictions, constancy 
through time (no frequent changes), and congruence between declared 
rules and official action.273 Al of these could also be subsumed under the 
heading of 'publicness' or for that mater 'transparency'. For Jeremy 
Waldron, the 'public character of law' lies in 'the fact that law presents 
itself not just as a set of commands by the powerful and not just as a set of 
rules recognized among an elite, but as a set of norms made publicly and 
issued in the name of the public, norms that ordinary people can in some 
sense appropriate as their own, qua members of the public.'274 That 
notion of 'public' has litle to do with the public-law/private-law divide, 
instead referring to al law. 'Public' here connotes a diluted democratic 
quality: law can be 'public' in that sense even if it has not been created 
through formaly democratic procedures -that is, even if it has not been 
made 'by' the people but only 'publicly'; when 'ordinary people' can appro-
priate it and consider it 'as their own' even if they have not voted for it. 
Based on this understanding of 'public', Benedict Kingsbury and 
Megan Donaldson have suggested reconceptualizing international law 
as an inter-public law which contains basic 'public law' principles that 
include legality, rationality, proportionality, rule oflaw and fundamental 
rights 'as wel as ( .. )an additional quality of "publicness" inherent in 
272 ee ils Jansen/Ralf Michaels, 'Private Law and the State', RabelsZ 71 (2007), 345-397, 
reprinted in ils Jansen/Ralf Michaels (ed .), Beyond the State: Rethinking Private Law 
(Tibingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 15-67 62. 273 . ' 
274 Lon Fuler, The Morality of Law ( ew Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), 33-41. Jeremy Waldron, 'Can There Be a Democratic Jurisprudence?', Emory Law Journal 58 
(2009), 675-712, 684 (emphasis partly added). 
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law'.275 'Publicness' is 'the claim oflaw to stand in the name of the whole 
. d ak h  h  1 . ' 276 oc1ety an to spe totat w  oesooety.
A pertinent concept -relying on 'publicity' rather than 'transparency' -
i that of 'public reason' as used in philosophical theories of deliberative 
democracy.277 These theories normaly involve a claim about the salutary 
efects of going public with reasons and arguments.278 Their assumption is 
that having to defend one's policy preferences in public predisposes one 
towards using public reason.279 According to Simone Chambers, public 
rea on involves justification and accountability directed at a public charac-
terized by pluralism. Public reasons (in the plural) are reasons that the 
public at large could accept.280 Publicity (and for that mater, transparency) 
'i thought to have a positive efect on deliberation by promoting a demo-
fr . bli ,281 cratic mechanism that pushes participants om private to pu c reason. 
Paralel to al this, one strand of political-science and international-
relations research has undergone a 'deliberative turn'. It claim that 
arguing -i.e. communicative behaviour on the basis of evolving prefer-
ences, in which arguments are given and which seeks to reach area oned 
con ensus -is not only an epiphenomenon of power and interest but is 
constitutive of international relations in its own right.282 In this liter-
ature, arguing (as just defined) is contrasted with bargaining (under-
tood as communicative behaviour on the basis of fixed preferences in 
which demands, threats and promises are exchanged). The gist is that 
arguing can be distinguished from bargaining through it triadic 
275 Benedict King bury/Megan Donald on, 'From Bilaterali m t~ Publicness _in 
International Law', in Ulrich Fastenrath et al. (eds.), From Bilateralism to Community 
Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma (Oxford Univer. ity P.ress, 20_1 l), 
79-89, 80 and 83, emphasis added. Inter-public law is not only a ene of ~ ~~ ~ 
between state as rational actors but independent of any con en u on a pnon pnnc1-
ples or morality; '(r)ather, it is the existence of law that both create a c~rtain _kind of 
ociety in its own right, through the practice of seeking law-governed rela~~n hip , and 
alows other communities -or publics -to come into being and a ert theu mterests, b ' 
making available certain institutional mechani ms to sati fy public law principle of 
rationality and rule oflaw, and by creating rhetorical pos ibilitie for demand that the 
law respond to the felt need of a particular public' (ibid., 84). 
276 Benedict Kingsbury, 'International Law a Inter-public Law', in Henry . Richard on/ 
Melissa S. Wiliams (eds.), omos XLIX: Moral Universalism and Pluralism ( ew York 
University Press, 2008), 167-204, 174. 
277 John Rawls, Political Liberalism ( ew York: Columbia niver ity Pre , 2005), Lecture 
VI: The Idea of Public Reason, 212-254. 
278 Chambers, 'Behind Closed Doors' 2004 (n 135), 390, cals thi a 'publicity principle'. 
279 Ibid. 280 Ibid. 281 Ibid., 392. 
282 Seminaly Thomas Risse, 'Let's Argue!', International Organization 54 {2000), 1-39. 
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nature.
283 
Arguing involves reference to a mutually accepted external 
authority so as to validate empirical or normative assertions; and that 
external authority might be an audience which serves as adjudicator of 
the better argument; and that audience might be the public observing the 
negotiations. It is within this paradigm that transparency would appear 
to be an indispensable element of global governance. 
The increasing transparency of international law is in line with the 
aspirations of these strands of legal, philosophical and IR research. It 
renders the law-making process more 'public', it makes visible the claim 
to speak to the entire global society, and it allows natural persons to 
'appropriate' it. Transparency is a necessary enabling condition for 
'public' discourse on a potential global 'public interest'.284 The reason 
is that in our pluralistic world marked by deep moral disagreement a 
substantive global public interest can be neither plausibly conceptualized 
nor identified. We therefore need a legal system which helps in creating 
and sustaining a 'public sphere' where 'public values' are lived, debated 
and updated.285 
Ultimately, with the structural change towards presumptive trans-
parency, international law is becoming 'public' law in all those senses 
mentioned above: a law which constrains political authority, which seeks 
to reconcile global political authority with individual autonomy, which is 
in the global public interest ('for' the public), and which is made under 
scrutiny of the public ('through' the public) even if not fully made 'by' a 
global public. The new transparency is one of numerous new public-law-
like features emerging in the international legal order and which are 
contributing to that order's ongoingpublification. And this publification 
is very welcome in that it creates a normativite renforcee of that order. 
19.3 Agenda for Future Research 
While this book attempts to map the terrain of transparency in interna-
tional law, it has shown that the concept of transparency has many 
different aspects and functions whose implications for international 
283 
Ulbert/Risse, 'Changing the Discourse' 2005 (n 196), 352-353. 
284 
On the problem of conceptualizing and identifying a 'global public interest', see Jost 
Delbriick (ed.), New Trends in International Lawmaking- International 'Legislation' in 
the Public Interest (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1997); Simone Peter, Public Interest 
and Common Good in International Law (Basel: Helbing und Lichtenhahn, 2012). 
285 
Kingsbury, 'Inter-public Law' 2008 (n 276), 192. 
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law could only tentatively be explored. The concluding chapter has 
touched upon a host of conceptual and normative issues that relate to 
different aspects of transparency but has not drawn (and possibly could 
not draw) a coherent picture. Further research is warranted both in a 
conceptual and in an empirical vein. 
We have seen that transparency inevitably mirrors its broader polit-
ical, economic and legal context; but while being shaped by its context, 
tran parency also has the potential to shape it in turn. A key analytical 
challenge is to identify the conditions under which transparency can 
indeed unfold any 'transformative potential'.286 Empirically, it is not 
clear whether and under what conditions transparency actually issues 
in better international law-making, in better application and enforce-
ment of the law, and in generally better outcomes.287 We also need to 
further investigate under what circumstances public speech (arguing or 
bargaining) has positive or negative governance effects.288 How should 
closed and open phases of international law-making be combined - and 
on the basis of which criteria? In order to determine this, a method of 
comparing and evaluating the costs and benefits of transparency o a to 
allocate the 'right' modicum of transparency would first have to be 
developed. However, because of the difficulty, maybe impos ibility, of a 
sensible quantification of the 'costs' and 'benefits' of transparency, uch a 
political-economy approach might not yield useful re ults. 
Further, it is basically an open question as to how effective the exi ting 
transparency requirements have been (in terms of compliance and 
impact). Do they normally realize their objectives, or are they irrelevant 
or even counterproductive (notably because of evasion)?289 It i plau ible 
that the impacts vary across broad issue areas (military, environmental, 
trade, etc.), and/or between national and international governance. Thi 
type of research would face serious challenges becau e 'natural 
286 Aarti Gupta, 'Transparency as Contested Political Terrain: \i ho Knows Wbat about the 
Global GMO Trade and Why Does it Matter?', Global Environmental Politics 10 (2010), 
32-52, 48-49. 
287 For example, Cosette Creamer and Beth Simmons (chapter 10 in thi volume) found no 
evidence of a positive correlation between the mere existence of tran parency in the 
realm of human rights (indicated by the existence of a national human rights in titu-
tion) and an improvement in human rights. 
288 Building on the research mentioned in nn 195-199. 
289 For example, the entry into force of the American 'Government in the un hine' Act 
seems to have resulted in a decrease in the number of official meeting , which uggests 
that decision-makers have met informally in private instead (John on, 'Open leeting 
and Clo ed Minds' 2004 (n 201), 25 fn. 47). 
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experiment' -type situations are difficult to find. Moreover, large-scale 
studies cannot take political, social and institutional nuances into 
account. Therefore, quantitative studies would need to be comple-
mented by qualitative accounts by diplomat officials of international 
organizations and NGO representatives. The real impact of transpar-
ency norms might ultimately not be identifiable because of venue-
shifting. Researchers could first look at empirical work done on domestic 
institutions to identify methodologies fit for transposition to interna-
tional level-research. To be welcomed here are creative proposals 
regarding institutions which decide and monitor transparency obliga-
tions, and settle disputes over disclosure. These would also have to 
examine how well the novel adjudicative mechanisms established to 
deal with access to information claims against international organiza-
tions function in practice. Finally, legal research might investigate 
how the domestic freedom of information laws are being used to access 
information about positions taken by governments in international 
organizations, or in proceedings before international courts and 
tribunals. 290 
Engaged legal scholars should be aware of possible political implica-
tions and uses of the object of their study. Engaged scholarship must 
admit that transparency of governance is only a necessary and not a 
sufficient condition for bringing about participation, accountability and 
possibly democracy in the global sphere. As Ann Florini has pointed out, 
' transparency by itself will accomplish nothing at all.'29 1 It would be 
na:ive to assume that information, once set free, will generate an 
informed and engaged public that will hold officials accountable.292 
Information must not only be made available, but be taken up and 
interpreted and used for political reaction. All this requires not only 
capacities (ranging from sufficient literacy to technical knowledge) but 
also a willingness on the side of the recipients of information, as well as 
the means to overcome obstacles such as countervailing economic inter-
ests. There is no automatic progress from global transparency to proto-
democratic forms of self-determination of a global citizenry. Therefore, 
290 
This is an idea by Megan Donaldson. 
291 
Fiorini, Coming Democracy 2003 (n 121), 38. See also Hale, 'Transparency, 
Accountability and Global Governance' 2008 (n 8), 74-76 on the 'transparency-action 
cycle'. 
292 
Mark Fenster, 'The Opacity of Transparency', Iowa Law Review 91 (2006), 
885- 949, 915. 
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and because of the costs associated with generating more transparency, 
the idea should not be oversold - it is no 'magic bullet'.293 Where, when, 
and how a transparency principle, possibly as a legal norm, can and 
hould come to bear in international law and global governance deserves 
further research. 
293 
Lord, Global Transparency 2006 (n 76), 125. 
